Historical and theoretical starting points of justice Justice as such has concerned humanity from the beginning. Specific records that can be considered clear and evident roots of justice date back to antiquity and are connected primarily with mythology. The embodiment of truth and justice is first linked to the goddess Maat, and later Isis of ancient Egypt. The goddess Maat also represented the concept of order and harmony, the natural balance of the universe established at the moment of creation. In Greek mythology, we can find records of the goddesses Themis and Dike (Dike was the daughter of Zeus and Themis), who represented legal order and justice. Among the Romans, these two goddesses merged into one - it was the goddess Justitia, who represented the embodiment of justice and also represents the allegory of justice as we know it today, that is, a young woman holding scales (symbol of justice) and a double-edged sword (symbol of decisiveness) in her hands; in her current form she is also depicted with a blindfold (symbol of impartiality).
If we want to approach the formation of justice, it is necessary to focus first on the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. Their teaching stems from the generally accepted Hellenic conception of justice, which lies primarily in justice as a civic virtue, presupposing loyalty to laws by adhering to them. Justice is understood equally as an individual quality in the moral sense, which has value in itself. Plato and Aristotle characterized it as arete - virtue, which is a permanent state with the ability to act morally. Plato understood it as moral excellence, which a just person strives for despite it bringing them neither success nor praise; Aristotle as the way in which we choose moral principles guiding our life toward eudaimonia, happiness. It is therefore not about performing random moral acts, as these are rather its result. Rather, it is about a permanent orientation of a person whose effort is a just life. Justice can be considered a primary virtue, as it transcends all other virtues (Gujdová, 2013).
Aristotle's concept advocates justice manifested in relation to a person. His reflection is accompanied by the assumption that, for both the just and the unjust, justice will be called the state on the basis of which people are capable of acting justly and indeed do act justly and want what is just. The same applies to injustice, on the basis of which people act unjustly and want what is unjust (Aristotle, 2011).
It is worth noting that Aristotle distinguished between moral justice and legal justice. Moral justice is reflected in personal relationships, such as the relationship between father and son, between brothers, between friends, etc. Legal justice is translated into public relationships. It is difficult to define justice as a fixed, general concept, because on one hand there is legal justice, which is formal, objective, and includes principles of equality and mutual benefit, but on the other hand Aristotle points out that the human factor always enters into situations of (in)justice and interpersonal relationships are dynamic, involving many complex elements, and therefore, according to him, it is possible to judge justice and define it only with regard to specific objects and specific situations.
Aristotle's concept also distinguishes two basic forms of justice, whose definition has persisted to the present day. Distributive justice is applied in the distribution of goods according to the rule "treat equals equally." Procedural (commutative, corrective) justice is applied in dealing with the individual according to the rule "to each what they deserve" (Nesvadba, 2006). Speaking of distributive justice means speaking of justice in the exercise of power. It concerns the proper ratio of those who have power to those who are entrusted to this power or exercise it. The individual does not stand against another individual, nor against many individuals, but against a social whole - the state. Thus it is clear that both sides are not on the same level, not only because the many represent more than one, but because the common good is of a higher degree than the good of the individual (Smreková, Palovičová, 2009).
Plato perceived justice as one of the basic virtues, in which, as in no other, theory and practice converge; justice governs relationships among people, but above all it governs and directs the coexistence of citizens in the state and finally the coexistence of many states alongside each other. Its effects and operation can best be demonstrated in the perfect state (Gujdová, 2013).
Plato understands justice as the foundation of the state and the measure of its perfection. He considered the state the only conceivable society and justice the foundation of social coexistence. The state is the environment in which the development of the idea of justice continues, which, objectifying itself in cosmic conditions, enters the human soul to reach its culmination in the state (Tomsa, 2007).
As has already been noted, Aristotle's distinction between distributive and procedural justice remains relevant today. Distributive justice over time became the domain of socialist theories, while procedural justice remained the domain of liberalism (Hayek, 1997).
In Aristotle's conception, emphasis was placed primarily on distribution according to merit; in the Middle Ages, conversely, a turn toward the idea of need can be observed, as assistance in need became the distributive imperative (Fisher, 1997). With the advent of the modern period and the Enlightenment, distributive justice was replaced by an emphasis on formal justice, which led to proceduralism, whose culmination can be found in Kant's philosophy of law (Günther, 1997). The motif of procedural justice remains very relevant in the discourse on social justice to this day, which can be seen especially in the theories of Rawls and Habermas (Blaha, 2010).
The universal conception of justice is also associated with the teachings of the great world religions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. These religions emphasize the importance of sharing, equality in treatment of the individual, the importance of not profiting at the expense of the disadvantaged in society, avoiding the sin of greed, and adhering to rules that guarantee honest, just, and fair behavior toward others (Reisch, 2002).
In matters of justice, Thomas Aquinas built on Aristotle. For Aquinas, the subject of justice was the distribution (exchange) of goods and burdens. Extensive reflections on justice can be found in several sections of his work Summa Theologica, but their core is perhaps most visible in the part called "Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues," which, even without citing quotations, testifies to the fact that for Aquinas, justice was a virtue, that is, a quality (Bárány, 2011).
Aquinas holds that the definition of justice allows us to understand truth. Because if every virtue is a rooted habit, it becomes the principle of a good act, and thus virtue is defined by the meaning of a good deed. The proper essence of justice in relations to others is expressed through demonstrating the right of every being, because a person is called just only if they respect the rights of others (Aquinas, 1920).
Of course, Aquinas did not think of justice merely as a spirit that fills the essence of the individual. He understandably extended his theory and understood it as something that concerns the whole society. According to Aquinas, justice reigns in a state when three fundamental structures of life are arranged in proper proportion. These are the relationships of individuals to one another, the relationships of society as a whole to individuals, and the relationships of individuals to society. These relationships include three basic forms of justice, namely (1) commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), which governs the relationship between individuals, (2) distributive justice (iustitia distributiva), which arranges the relationship of society as a whole to individuals, and finally (3) legal justice (iustitia legalis), which brings order to the relationship of individuals to society as a whole (Bubík, 2007).
In the 16th century, the Enlightenment brought a new view of justice as an idea conditioned by human needs and interests. One of the most prominent figures of the Enlightenment in the context of justice was David Hume.
Hume's theory is significant from the perspective of several factors and influenced subsequent generations of philosophers in examining the concept of justice. First, he perceived justice as a social construct that is related to human needs and interests. Second, he links justice more to human passions than to reason. Furthermore, the power of justice and just rules are inextricably tied to the protection of one's property, and finally, he views public good as the sole basis of justice (Pomerleau, 2013).
According to Hume, justice arises from the well-understood self-interest of people with regard to their actual condition. It governs cooperation with respect to social benefit, and sympathizes with this governance and with the general good. A just person does not shortchange others and returns what was borrowed to them (Hume points to the similarity with the Aristotelian idea that justice consists in everyone receiving what they deserve, what is due to them). However, according to him, justice is not a natural virtue, but rather an "artificial" virtue, because it depends on the existence of human conventions and skills, and because the main motive of justice is the sense of justice (Slote, 2014).
Against this background, Hume thus defines the moral significance of justice as a virtue. Interest in just rules and states flows from a personal calculus of utility. Human nature is such that we can realize our interests in social cooperation more effectively than in isolation. Moreover, humans must satisfy their needs under conditions of moderate scarcity, and are rather egoistically disposed, with generosity being limited. Therefore, social cooperation must be governed by intersubjectively recognized and effective conventions that serve the common benefit (Pomerleau, 2013).
Hume's theory was built upon by Immanuel Kant, who based his rationalist convictions precisely on Hume's skepticism and sought to create a new revolutionary philosophical system, which today includes a collection of books and essays, including a theory of justice.
For Kant, justice is inextricably linked with duties that individuals are obliged to observe. With reference to his theory, three conditions must be met for justice to be maintained: (1) a person must pay attention to the external manifestations of the interpersonal behavior of others, (2) justice must relate to the willingness to perform it, and not exclusively to wishes, desires and needs, (3) intended consequences are not morally relevant. A person does not commit injustice by considering stealing someone else's property, but by arbitrarily taking steps to appropriate something without permission; and this act is not just regardless of what positive consequences are intended. According to Kant, there is only one innate human right valid for all; it is the right to freely do what an individual wants, as long as it is consistent with the freedom of all others and consistent with universal law. Thus, the right of one person to act freely must not violate the freedom of others or violate their rights. This leads Kant to the final universal principle of justice, insofar as he claims that every act is just if its essence leads to the freedom of will of the individual being able to coexist together with the freedom of others in accordance with universal law. He adds that although coercive forces may be used against other persons in some cases, which logically involves a restriction of freedom, it does not necessarily have to be an injustice if these forces are used to redress an unjust abuse of freedom, for example in self-defense or even war. Kant refers to the three ancient rules of justice: (1) a person should be honest in dealing with others; (2) a person should avoid injustice toward others, even if it requires effort to avoid them; (3) if a person cannot avoid associating with others, they should at least try to respect their rights (Pomerleau, 2013).
The traditional theory of the social contract (as understood by Kant) was later built upon by John Rawls. Rawls (1995) understands justice as the first virtue of social institutions, just as truth is the first virtue of a system of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise, any effective and well-organized laws and constitutions must be changed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolable rights, founded on justice, which even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. Justice therefore does not permit that the loss of freedom for some persons could be made right by a greater good for other persons. Justice does not allow that the sacrifices of a small group of persons could be outweighed by a greater amount of benefits for more persons. In a just society, therefore, the liberties of equal citizenship are understood as something firmly given; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.
The Concept of Justice in Eastern Ideas
The theory and concept of justice in our European context is associated and popularized primarily from the perspective of Western ideology. In Eastern cultures (e.g., India, China), the concept of justice is understood more comprehensively, often also differently, even though in many respects they arrived at similar, if not identical, concepts as the Western world.
Eastern cultures point out that justice concerns not only the correct assessment, decision-making, and enforcement of law. It is necessary to focus on the complexity of its meaning, because it refers to the totality of human existence, not just the mere fact of judging what is just and unjust.
The concept of justice in India includes the principle of dharma, through which the individual comes to terms with all the demands of life (Sharma, 2006/2007). In India, the concept of dharma forms the basis of almost all philosophies and religions. The word dharma can also be translated as that which "upholds," "carries," or "keeps in motion." It is a kind of original law and social order, encompassing morality, ethics, and, last but not least, religious principles.
Loosely speaking, it characterizes a certain cosmic ethics and the ability derived from it to judge what is right and wrong. It thus becomes an innate or mutually inseparable property and nature of everything - just as salty taste is naturally contained in a grain of salt. The purpose of dharma is the order of the world, and so dharma itself keeps the world in harmonious motion. Many of these dharma rules are stated in classical Indian scriptures, mainly in the so-called dharma-shastras, i.e., scriptures describing dharma. These are mostly legal codes that often precisely define how every individual or society, in their social and spiritual position, should act. In many areas, it is thus firmly determined, from a higher principle, which human activities are good and are followed by a positive reaction, and which are bad and bring reactions in the form of suffering. This system of values is, within their concept, universally valid and does not depend on opinion and personal judgment. A situation may thus arise where a person may think that what they are doing is good, and may also be able to intellectually justify it and impress others. However, if this activity is not in accordance with the universal definition of good, they will nevertheless receive a negative reaction for this act.
However, providing a certain concise definition is very difficult; the development of the concept has a long and varied history, and a large set of meanings and interpretations has been gradually assigned to the original meaning over the centuries (from the development of the concept of justice to religious rules). Dharma is not only the key to human behavior and the regulation of life. Dharma can be different for different social strata and situations. Understanding its principles leads to knowledge of authenticity, reason, truth, consciousness, and leads to will, strength, action, and subsequently to contentment, happiness, peace, care. From this perspective, dharma thus represents justice, because it is an expression of law, truth, existence, and also encompasses knowledge and virtue (Sharma, 2006/2007). Dharma is dharma if it presupposes and fulfills true satisfaction - material (concerning the body, sensory pleasure, social order) as well as spiritual (which is more permanent and relates to the soul, the personal mental needs of the individual or society).
The question of justice in China is, or was, understood primarily within the scope of Confucius's teachings. Of course, as has already been noted, even with this teaching we encounter the fact that the concept of justice clashes with different cultures and traditions, as Western cultures tend to create many reflections and ambiguities when trying to explain the ideas of Confucianism in their true meaning.
In Chinese culture, justice is understood as a moral principle, while the Western world perceives it as "profit" or "a means of acquiring profit." When acquiring profit, Western cultures refer to concepts such as "civil law," "law," which relate to the distributive system and social structure. In contrast, the Confucian idea of justice concerns primarily the moral duty of the individual, and thus emphasizes the principle of obligation over the principle of rights. This commitment of moral duty permeates the entire essence of a person's being; it is something that governs their life and actions toward others in society; honesty and justice become an internal motivation, and consequently maintain harmonious interpersonal relationships and peace. Emphasis on honesty of action is more important than profit, because every solution must be just and consistent with human feeling. Justice means finding the truth and preserving it is more important than life itself.
If we were to summarize the preceding theories into a more definite form, the contribution of Váně (2006) presents itself, who created a typology based on the assumptions that justice is legitimized through three basic principles that have had varying weight throughout history. Justice is thus derived either: a) from the divine principle (i.e., justice within the competence of the gods, "God's justice"), b) from the metaphysical principle (i.e., derived from the order of being, nature, ethics), or c) from social reality, or is derived from its variability.
Many literary works have been devoted to justice; several significant figures from the fields of psychology, philosophy, or sociology have dealt with it, whether marginally or as their main specialization. Over the years, many theories and definitions have emerged that sought to clarify the essence of justice. It is therefore essential to keep in mind that every theory of justice is directly dependent on and derived from the specific ideological and moral worldview of the individual authors.
Conclusion
It would be possible to continue with an overview of other significant theories of justice, whose discussion would deserve several dozen pages, if not a separate publication. However, the primary goal of this paper was not a summary of diverse views on justice and an in-depth analysis of the approaches of individual social sciences. The intention was to point out the historical pillars of justice, from which most theories that perceived justice as a normative ideal or as a life philosophy were derived.
However, the modern scholarly conception is also supplemented by a descriptive approach. Thus, these conceptualizations do not focus on what justice should be, but rather on how it is perceived by the individual. In this sense, understanding the meaning of justice requires understanding what people perceive as just (Greenberg, Colquitt, 2005).
Author: Mgr. Denisa Rovenská References
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