The concept of social justice and its philosophical and ethical foundations are of utmost importance for understanding the questions of Europe’s identity from the perspective of the social dimension. Without understanding the contemporary philosophical and ethical discourse on social justice, we lack a real theoretical background for an adequate analysis of this issue.
The concept of social justice in the sense that we reflect in terms of its current discourse appears only at the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of the first to thematize this term was the French socialist J. P. Proudhon. Later, the British liberal J. S. Mill also subscribed to this meaning. The mentioned concept of social justice introduced another dimension into the discussion of justice, namely the demand for economic justice in distribution. The effort for social justice in the nineteenth century was also accompanied by the development of Marxism, which likewise significantly helped spread the idea of social justice. Of course, Marxism rejected the concept of social justice as an "outdated phrase", but it cannot be overlooked that social justice also appears implicitly in Marx’s work. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the concept of social justice was already commonly used in the indicated economic sense, and so it is today.
Two Views of Social Justice
Before we get to the best-known contemporary theoretical views of social justice, let us enter the issue through a characteristic example by the American philosopher Robert Nozick. Nozick tells the story of the basketball player Wilt Chamberlain, who plays excellent basketball and attracts all fans with his game. Does he deserve a higher income when he is the best? - asks Nozick. His answer is, understandably, yes. If Chamberlain plays so well that people are willing to pay disproportionately more to see his performance than they would value the rest of his teammates, then according to Nozick those money rightly belong to him. (Nozick, 1974, pp. 160-163)
It is essential to realize right at the beginning that within our intuitive reflection on whether W. Chamberlain’s disproportionately higher income is just, or justified, we encounter a conflict between two very common intuitive understandings of justice. The first prompts us to assign each person as much as he "deserves", and thus those who are more capable are, understandably, assigned more, or everything. Nozick uses this form of our intuitions about justice in his example. Let us call this dimension of justice justice of performance, or "individual justice". According to it, an individual’s evaluation should be proportional to the performance he has put forth. However, the quality of this performance is essential, because the more capable should be fairly rewarded "according to merit" under justice of performance. The question still remains: who determines the quality (merit, or worthiness) of the performance in question? The answer of modern neoliberals, including Nozick as well as Hayek, is the market mechanism. These philosophers also reject any other mechanism for recognizing quality, such as the significance of performance for the community, the a priori superiority of the performances of privileged strata, or the moral force of performance (moral merit). Finally, the first person to stop asking about the mechanism for determining the quality of performance and turn attention to its quantity, and thus to the work accomplished, was Marx. In his idea of communism he also thematized another distributive principle that denies the mechanism for determining the quality of performance - human needs.
We shall call the mentioned dimension of justice "individual justice", because it generally rewards the individual on the basis of his own qualities (however recognized), regardless of other individuals or the whole of society. Thus, as just or unjust can only be described the relation of the individual to his things, while the relation of the individual and his property to other individuals with their property is in this case irrelevant. Let us also recall that in socio-philosophical thought today we encounter mainly three basic demands regarding "individual justice": first - just is what a person acquired in accordance with currently valid law and the market mechanism (Nozick, Hayek, and others); second - just is to reap the fruits of one’s labor, or to receive a flat amount of what one needs (Marx); third - justice should reflect moral merit (MacIntyre).
The second intuition about justice, by contrast, brings us to the idea that it is necessary to take less capable individuals into account as well (whatever the criterion of quality, or ability, may be: the market or anything else), and therefore no one should be treated in such a way that the person loses dignity or even the very possibility of survival. This intuition arises especially from an understanding of justice as equal access and awakens in people primarily in acute situations, when looking at the suffering of the poor and the hungry. Simply put, if someone has "justly" reached billions and others "justly" die of hunger, then this is not "just". In this case, procedural justice is not enough, nor is "individual" justice; instead, the "outcome" principle of social justice is offered. The meaning of this conception of justice is therefore the equalization of social conditions for all individuals, or at least ensuring a dignified minimum for the survival of every human being. The relation of the individual to his things in this case depends on his relation to other individuals with their property, or on his relation to the whole society of which he is a member. While in the conception of "individual justice" one can speak only of a just relation of the individual to things, in this case we speak of a just relation to other people. This approach to justice can quite safely be called "social justice", even though in a narrower sense. The very word "social" evokes the view of society as a whole, and thus justifies non-distributive demands. In a broader sense, however, social, or distributive, justice also includes the above-mentioned "individual" justice. To avoid confusing the discussion with identical terms, let us call this dimension of social justice "redistributive justice", because de facto it necessarily requires redistributive policy. (A similar delimitation of the two basic intuitions about social justice in modern society can also be found in MacIntyre’s work The Loss of Virtue: MacIntyre, 2004.)
Let us return after a short interpretive detour to Nozick’s example. The advantage of the example of the exceptional basketball player seems to lie in three dimensions: in addition to pointing to cooperation within social life, it also facilitates the recognizability of performance quality, because in sports performances it is predetermined and undeniable what counts as valuable; and finally, third, it narrows the issue largely to the problem of individuals' natural abilities, which Rawls called the natural lottery. If we consider only the dimension of "individual justice" favored by Nozick, we thereby sideline the issue of the "natural lottery" in favor of the naturally more capable, more gifted, and "market-ready". Rawls has fundamental objections to this approach, arguing that the natural abilities a person has are, from the standpoint of morality, nothing that social norms should lead us to value one person more than others. A person does not choose his natural abilities. They are given to him; he is born with them, regardless of whether he deserves them or not. In Rawls’s words, this is a game of natural lottery, and no one can choose which ticket he will draw in this game.
Rawls also notes that it is not permissible for morality, and especially justice, to be decided after abilities have already been assigned. That could lead to extreme bias and subjectivity, which is not acceptable in questions of justice. Rawls therefore excludes natural abilities from considerations of justice. Once we abstract from these abilities, we can ask the question of justice more correctly. If, under these circumstances (under the influence of the so-called veil of ignorance about one’s natural qualities), we asked basketball player Chamberlain how he would imagine justice in the distribution of profit from a basketball game, he would probably not adamantly claim that the best player should receive disproportionately more than the rest of the team. He himself would not know whether he would be the best player.
On the opposition between Nozick’s and Rawls’s views, the basic tension between contemporary approaches to social justice can be exposed. One could characterize one as "market justice" (Nozick, Hayek) and the other as "redistributive justice" (Rawls).
Spontaneous Order and Moral Merit
Hayek’s conception of justice is based on the principle that everything is treated according to the same rules (Hayek, 1991, p. 40). This is an approach to so-called formal (procedural) justice, which Hayek contrasts with (distributive, substantive, or also economic) justice. For Hayek, the highest value is freedom, and according to him it is compatible only with formal justice, not with social justice.
According to Hayek, social justice is based on the principle of "to each what he morally deserves" (Hayek, 1995, p. 129) and is already present in natural human instincts. However, for Hayek this idea has no meaningful content, because, first, moral merit cannot be precisely determined by which the community should distribute socially useful goods, and second, this idea cannot be reconciled with the notion of an open and free society functioning on the basis of spontaneous order, which is the market mechanism. Ultimately, therefore, social justice is only an illusory idea - a mirage that, according to Hayek, is moreover very dangerous because it threatens the effective functioning of the "quasi-divine adaptation to the human situation" - the market.
In the first stage of his argument, Hayek points out that the term social justice has no concrete content. Of course, Hayek is also aware that the idea of social justice is not entirely empty of meaning. He himself very convincingly finds connotations for this term, revealing its content in the idea of moral merit. (Hayek, 1991, pp. 34, 103) As he writes: "it is a great truth that our esteem for individual activities often differs from the value that the market assigns to them; and we express this feeling by protesting against its injustice." (Hayek, 1991, p. 77) The fundamental problem in defining standards of social justice, however, is, according to Hayek, precisely the impossibility of determining merit on the basis of some moral model. As D. Hume had already written long ago, the idea of human merit is too vague for any rule of distribution to follow from it. In order to determine the moral worthiness of a specific act, we would, according to Hayek, need a complete value system. Because if there is no precise definition of merit, or precise moral yardstick, the redistributive mechanism rests on the willfulness of the planner.
This would seem to be a very persuasive argument, but the question is what remains to us if we abandon efforts to realize social justice. Do we thereby finally rid ourselves of the problem of determining merit? Hayek essentially claims yes and openly inclines toward the market mechanism, which in his view "impartially" solves the problem of remuneration without assuming any notion of merit. However, as one may object, the market mechanism also favors some activities over others, some character traits over others, some goals and values over others. It therefore also creates a certain system of "merits", which, however, and on this Hayek is unfortunately right, have nothing to do with morality.
The determination of moral merit pointed out by Hayek can indeed be a problem. Nevertheless, a comprehensive value system may not even be necessary if society does not try to design the entire redistributive system on the basis of moral merit. Determining which action is generally morally meritorious, however, does not seem as impossible as Hayek imagines. The sense of justice, as well as moral merit or notions of the proper level of consumption, arise from the moral framework of a particular society. This fact is also pointed out by many classical liberals, including Popper and Jouvenel (Popper, 1994, p. 11; Jouvenel, 1998, p. 31). Nor is it impossible to decipher meritorious professions and meritorious activities according to the ethical standards of a given society. Particularly suitable in this context is the communitarian argumentation of "shared convictions", according to which the merit of certain performances in a specific community can be defined. It is necessary to point out that the market mechanism cannot be regarded as an untouchable taboo, and one can quite calmly intervene in it for the purpose of valuing those morally meritorious activities that this mechanism by itself cannot value. Moral merit is not entirely unrecognizable in any society, and therefore it seems quite relevant to attempt to realize this dimension of social justice through redistributive policy.
Communitarian critique opens up a new field of possibilities for solving this problem. As Walzer observes, liberal justice leaves room for the market to dominate all spheres of society. The medieval hierarchy in modern societies is replaced by general effort and competition, with merchant talent becoming the basic merit. The principle of justice thus essentially becomes "a career open to talent". (Walzer, 2002, p. 39) According to Walzer, however, it is much more justified to ask about the rules of distribution within individual spheres of society with the help of social meanings, or shared convictions within communities. This idea can also be grasped in the sense that we give greater value to those morally meritorious professions that, according to the shared convictions of the community, should be valued in this way. Entering the market mechanism, if we assume it, would naturally be a necessity.
Few in modern Western society doubt that the morally meritorious professions of doctor, teacher, or social worker deserve high remuneration. The only one presenting this doubt is the impersonal market mechanism, which often values these noble professions very modestly or even miserably. However, if a particular society knows how to determine the merit of certain professions (and here, in addition to doctors, teachers, social workers, artists, and scientists, we could include demanding and dangerous professions such as mining and other manual professions, etc.), it should also ensure their adequate income. In other words, if values such as education, knowledge, or health are valid in society, then the merit of certain professions can also be derived from these values. Although, on the other hand, for example, "the education sector does not yet provide the population with such quality education and qualifications that would be coherent with the needs of the majority of employers. At the same time, it would enable most of the population to become continuously employable on the labor market..." (Loran, 2010, p. 43) If society cannot ensure that the standard of living of people in meritorious professions is at least as high as the standard of living of those whose professions are not considered morally meritorious and who are valued only by the market mechanism, then one cannot speak of a just society.
Conclusion
In accordance with these ideas, I consider one of the significant alternatives to the question of social justice to be a certain harmonization of Marx’s "individual justice" ("to each according to his labor") and Rawls’s "redistributive justice" (the negation, or weakening, of the natural lottery), while I see the embodiment of Rawls’s idea of "moral arbitrariness" not only in a distributive principle that ensures maximum advantage and minimum income, but in a distributive principle that ensures the smallest possible social and economic inequalities in society. Provisionally, therefore, the distributive criterion that, in my opinion, could in principle be regarded as socially just might sound something like this: To each according to his labor, while ensuring a dignified minimum standard of living for the good life of the individual, as interpreted by the particular society, and with regard to reducing social inequality to the lowest possible level, while maintaining adequate remuneration for morally meritorious acts and professions and preserving a level of consumption that does not devastate the environment and does not turn human beings into slaves of their own consumerism. In such a distributive criterion, Marx, Walzer, Rawls, as well as Habermas and MacIntyre could find themselves. In such a distributive criterion, what would matter would be the proper harmonization of the "individual" and "redistributive" components of social justice. Such a distributive criterion is not impossible to fulfill, if the narrow individual interests of the rich and powerful are not constantly directed against its realization. Democracy offers "weapons" to secure social justice, but without the will and activity of those who suffer most under the yoke of a socially unjust society, "the ice will not move". Without the will and determination of ordinary people, even the "ideal" of social justice, which in my view consists in the distributive criterion of "to each according to his (real) needs", will never be fulfilled. Both of these alternatives that I have presented, in my opinion, express the interest of the majority of society, and I do not consider it unrealistic to achieve at least one of them. "The mentioned facts should be a natural part of ethical education in the educational process, with an emphasis on understanding and becoming aware of the everyday-used categories of ethical education and morality, the principles of humanism, justice and equality, honesty and conscientiousness, and awareness of the significance of moral feelings, moral norms and values..." (Kyseľová, 2009, p. 143)
Author: PhDr.Ľudovít Hajduk, PhD. Bibliographic References
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The lecture was delivered at the international scientific conference Applied Ethics in Social Work and Other Helping Professions, which took place on 20 - 21 October 2010 in Piešťany and was published in the proceedings from this conference: MÁTEL, A. – SCHAVEL, M. – MÜHLPACHR, P. – ROMAN, T. 2010. Aplikovaná etika v sociálne práci a ďalších pomáhajúcich profesiách. Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie. Bratislava : VŠZaSP sv. Alžbety. 413 s. ISBN 978-80-89271-89-4.