Introduction
In the scholarly literature, we find many concepts and especially justifications of the demand for state neutrality, and most of them can, naturally, be classified as liberal conceptions. The demands for enforcing state neutrality cannot be unambiguously characterized as a sign of moral indifference or boundless tolerance, which some attribute to political impartiality or public withdrawal with respect to individual conceptions of the good. State neutrality is undoubtedly an issue not only of modern moral and political philosophy, but also a subject of political discussion in the context of many current matters (migration, abortion, same-sex marriages, etc.). The exact meaning and scope of what “blind” justice should (and should not) take into account in seeking solutions to such value-based questions is today a central topic of scholarly debates.
State neutrality
In general, the call for a neutral state is encountered in connection with separating the state from moral (e.g., religious), ideological, or political conviction. Thus, it is the position according to which the state should not favor one religious belief over another, believers over atheists, conservatives over liberals, and so on. It should therefore create, support, and promote a tolerant public culture in which people, at least in their outward behavior, respect one another. It is important to emphasize that this respect is required from persons who adhere to a certain conviction, not from the convictions themselves. People do not have a moral duty to “respect” others’ choices in a moral sense, but it is enough that they do not interfere with those choices simply because they do not accept them (Raes, 1995). The call for state neutrality can also be interpreted as an attempt to ground political (state) institutions on scientifically based foundations that are ethically and value-neutral, that is, on some kind of “impartial standpoint.” From this perspective, the state is neutral if it does not proceed from a specific ideology that could be a partisan standpoint.
Another demand for state neutrality relates primarily to qualitative impartiality in terms of pursuing a quantitative common goal. Classical (Benthamite) utilitarianism is in this context regarded as “neutral” insofar as it does not prefer one particular source of utility over another, but is concerned only with the instrumental contribution that contributes to overall utility as the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. This is a subjective or preference-based account of neutrality. Arguments in favor of state neutrality can also be linked to the value of equality among people in the sense of equal access of citizens to the state. The state is neutral insofar as it acknowledges and upholds general conditions of justice. Even in this case impartiality is a central notion, but unlike its utilitarian interpretation, impartiality as equal respect does not arise from a qualitative weighing of sources of human pleasure or pain, but from a moral understanding of the human person. As human beings, we all have the right to equal treatment by the state, regardless of our personal conception of the good.
In conceptions of state neutrality based on anti-perfectionism, the legitimate task of the state and political order is not to enforce or even stimulate particular ideals of human character and personality, irrespective of whether they are based on moral truth or not. Rawls’s procedural justification of his principles of justice, chosen under a “veil of ignorance” in the conditions of an “original position,” is an example of such an argument for the demand for a neutral state (Rawls, 1971, 1996, Jurová, 2012).
The demand for state neutrality may also be derived from the promotion of the priority of individual liberty, which means that the state should not interfere with human freedom, except for its formal guarantee and protection. As an institution, the state has the right to intervene in individual freedom when that freedom is threatened, or when it threatens the freedom of another individual (Nozick, 1974). A liberal argument in favor of state neutrality also understands it as impartiality, related to the requirement that rules (laws) should be “general” or “impersonal” rather than specific (Hayek, 1994). Here, neutrality means that people have the right to behave according to legal regulations and to use them in any way that suits them. In effect, they have lawful rights to moral mistakes, provided they act within the bounds of law.
In another sense, the demand for state neutrality is connected to the recognition of the incomparability of values. Since individual values and value choices are incomparably different, the state should not prioritize one value or set of values over others. Grounding politics on explicit value choices would mean that state power is based on its own selection of specific values. This does not mean that it is not possible to objectively evaluate the difference between right and wrong, good and bad, moral and immoral, but from an objectivist perspective it would be wrong for the state to impose certain values on its citizens (Dworkin, 1986). By contrast, Feinberg (1988) derives the demand for state neutrality as an essential need to separate public and private morality, while maintaining that the state may express concrete value convictions through its policies and legal statutes if those are objectively true or widely shared by its citizens and if they are limited in their application in public life.
Different conceptions of state neutrality can lead to different kinds of states, from minimal states to social democratic states, from liberal states to republican states. The demand for neutrality aims to address various problems of axiological, moral, political, or even purely pragmatic nature. In all conceptions of state neutrality, however, as Raes (1995, p. 139) notes, the central point is the “meaning of understanding ‘impartial rules’ in society” and the question of “when and why the state may use force to make citizens comply with rules” among “equal legal subjects.”
Moral and value pluralism in a neutral state
In considering the legitimacy of promoting morality in an (ethically) neutral democratic state, attention should be focused on several concepts. In this context, classical liberals and utilitarians emphasize the need to distinguish between what is considered immoral because it affects public interests and what is perceived as immoral in the purely private sphere (e.g., Mill, 1971; Hart, 1963, and others). Whether something is or is not a matter of public interest depends on whether it is itself likely to damage legitimate interests of third parties. This liberal and utilitarian approach to so-called “public morality” or the “morality of the legal state” is not central moral evaluation of what is right or wrong, but rather assessment of the impact of actions in terms of their beneficial or harmful consequences for others (Lyons, 1983). A different view is Devlin’s consequentialist approach (Devlin, 1965), which highlights morality as a cultural artifact. Even when moral conviction may differ across cultures, the right of cultures to preserve their own integrity nevertheless presents itself as a universal moral claim. It is a moral right of cultures to protect their constitutive moral convictions. Society as a “community of ideas,” including shared reflections on politics and ethics, relies on common feelings such as what it calls “common sense” (Devlin, 1965, p. 10). Without a substantial common agreement on what is good and bad, no society can exist. A moral problem does not arise when members of a given culture freely accept and observe shared moral conviction that represents their “common sense.” Communities or cultures, however, should first of all respect democracy and individual rights guaranteed by the state. They have no right to demand tolerance for practices imposed on their members against their will, and they also have no right to force people to remain members of the community. Community-specific rights based on cultural differences may be invoked only if community members have a democratic voice and freely accept the values protected by these rights (Raes, 1992). In communitarian discourse, this is a demand for a so-called “sensitive community” (Jurová, 2013, p. 115).
According to Raes (1995), one cannot claim that moral pluralism and changes in individuals’ moral convictions, which are a natural part of contemporary Western democratic societies, would in fact constitute a threat to social cohesion. Moral attitudes and views may change without destroying society. Their change or the existence of differing moral attitudes in society are not necessarily “losses,” but rather may represent a desirable transformation of the existing social order. Therefore, moral pluralism and state neutrality should not be understood as enemies of social cohesion and social integration. On the contrary, they may create precisely the conditions in society that allow one to handle processes of social disintegration (Raes, 1995, p. 150).
Recognition of personal autonomy, and the securing of human rights and freedoms of individuals in a democratic state, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for individuals to live a life consistent with their own value preferences. Conceptions of good for individuals and communities in society are often opposing and incommensurable; nevertheless, we maintain that discussion of moral questions and the setting of morality in society is necessary even in ethically neutral democratic states. A government with minimal competencies, advocated for example by Robert Nozick (1974), does not exist in pure form today. We believe that the incommensurability of conceptions of good does not exclude the possibility of some shared conceptions of harmful conduct. No matter how great cultural and ethical diversity in society may be, it is indisputable that in pluralistic democratic societies there is consensus regarding what each culture considers bad or undesirable. For example, this includes physical harm, deprivation of freedom or life, destruction, or theft of property. Of course, this consensus cannot be generalized to all value preferences, but here we are identifying so-called public morality. The state is expected to seek and above all to provide a shared communicative platform that allows constructive dialogue about what different conceptions of good and different communities in society generally accept as desirable or, conversely, harmful. At the same time, however, the state must remain independent of any particular (religious, ethical, ideological) conception of good, that is, ethically neutral.
Rawls’s argument (1996) for a neutral public understanding of morality, similarly to Dworkin’s defense of public policy (1986), is based on searching for neutrality among different conceptions of good and is strongly anti-perfectionist, which means it advocates the promotion of ideals of good not through political power. Rawls’s approach nevertheless leaves room for certain state measures that are based on concrete moral ideals. Social institutions must be anti-perfectionist, but it is not excluded that legislative decisions may reflect certain “ideals of good” (Rawls, 1971, p. 238). Decision-making processes should be based on a norm of equal respect, while the outcomes of these processes remain open. If such decisions respect general procedural requirements, they should be accepted as fair. Rawls’s concept of neutrality is therefore strongly determined by a definition of rationality that leaves room only for strategic reasoning of representative persons in the original position (Jurová, 2012, pp. 66–74).
Critics of Rawls’s concept of justice and state neutrality from the communitarian camp deny the validity of his premises. Raz (1986) questions the defensibility and credibility of Rawls’s approach to political neutrality. A consensus on how to choose among perfectionist principles cannot be ruled out, he argues, because the very ways or methods of evaluating different ideals are themselves subjects of evaluative controversy. The priority of right over good, which is foundational in Rawls’s conception (Jurová, 2012), is unacceptable for communitarians, because what is just from the perspective of the state can be determined only if we know what is good for its citizens. According to Raz’s liberal perfectionism, governments should proceed from some conception of good, so that the concept of law and justice should not develop independently of any conception of good, but should include a plurality of conceptions of good. The state should not be inspired by a “policy of neutral indifference,” but should pursue such policy that protects and supports personal autonomy: “Concern for the dignity and integrity of persons requires moral pluralism, not neutrality or exclusion of ideals” (Raz, 1986, p. 127).
Moral pluralism is not a stance that says one way of life is equally valuable as any other (freely chosen) way of life. In this context Raes (1995, p. 160) convincingly argues for plurality among morally good options, understanding pluralism as a position according to which people should have freedom of choice among valuable options, rather than between whatever options happen to be available. A morally relevant option can only be a choice made through informed consent and grounded on reasons, such that “just wanting something” is not a sufficient reason for that choice. This brings us to the demand that the state provide its citizens not only with basic information but also with basic social goods, resources, or capabilities so that their choices can truly be considered informed and uncoerced choices for which they have relevant reasons.
Creating an optimal political and social environment for people, as informed citizens, to choose their own ideals of good is the obligation of the government that leads the state. The government can and should support a broad range of valuable conceptions of a good life and should dissuade citizens from bad or empty ideals. The way of promoting valuable conceptions of good, however, must not be coercive but persuasive, that is, such that does not undermine the value of individual autonomy.
Searching for “shared moral understanding” through moral dialogue
As we noted above, thinkers with liberal orientations provide various arguments in favor of a neutral state and promote them in different ways. Liberals themselves, however, admit that even if the state is (ethically) neutral, provided there is consensus in society on a set of common values, these will naturally be reflected in laws as well (Gutmann, 198, p. 319). In this context, we therefore focus on the communitarian demand for the necessity of discussion about so-called “shared moral understanding” in society (Etzioni, 2018). Communitarians criticize liberal premises and attitudes on many fronts—from the so-called “unanchored self,” through the priority of right over good, to ethical or value neutrality of the state (Jurová, 2013, pp. 37–51). In the discussion on state neutrality, they especially point out that social order requires identifying and protecting some core set of shared values that should be accepted and voluntarily advanced by all. One reason such a shared set of values should exist is that different communities, groups, or factions in society with different interests and values must be able to create common public policies and prevent potential conflicts from developing into irreconcilable disputes that could lead to social breakdown.
Through shared moral understanding (from English: shared moral understanding, SMU), that is, through processes of anchoring a set of commonly acknowledged values, society (the state) sets firm fundamental values that remain inviolable under all circumstances, though they are continually discussed and open to adaptation to new social conditions or transformations if there is broad social consensus for it. Etzioni (2018, p. 16) in this regard emphasizes that the set of “basic” values is decisive for several reasons. He gives an example from the political situation in the United States, where in recent years there has been sharp polarization between conservative and liberal citizens, while ever less attention is paid to what both positions have in common—that is, what stands “in the middle” of this spectrum and where broad agreement should be. Polarization is regarded as a major reason why the government is in chaos and why a large majority of Americans respect it. From a communitarian perspective, the crucial issue is whether polarization concerns secondary values, and thus can be reconciled by appealing to basic values, or whether it is holistic, leading to irreconcilable differences. If the moral consensus collapse were holistic, moral dialogues would not lead to shared moral understanding, or conversely, they would restore the necessary moral consensus by resulting in the creation of a new core of shared values. Analogously, this reasoning can be applied to current polarization in Slovak society in relation to government measures concerning the pandemic or ethically sensitive topics such as, for example, the abortion question.
Another example of such polarization is the treatment of immigrants and minorities, with approaches differing by country. Some aim at complete assimilation of immigrants (e.g., France), others call for elimination of all previous moral obligations to country of origin and culture (e.g., the USA). By contrast, the British have concluded that because of the diversity of the United Kingdom, the government should not promote a single national identity (Parekh, 2000). There are many approaches to this issue, among which a particularly notable one is that described by Etzioni as “unity in diversity” (Etzioni, 2007, pp. 186–192). This approach is based on the conviction that there is no reason to treat social disorder as a threat if different members of society pray to different gods, maintain distinct subcultures, and retain secondary loyalty to their country of origin, as long as they are primarily loyal to their new country, accept the democratic regime as a way of handling differences, learn the language or languages of the nation, and observe the law. The concept of shared moral understanding here serves to anchor which moral values count as “diverse” and which as “united” (common), especially when social change requires reconsideration of the set of values recognized in common. In this way, it helps identify what is considered basic values in a given society and what is secondary values, which are diverse and enrich rather than threaten social order.
What, however, is the role of the state in establishing and subsequently structuring communication about values in general and in enabling moral dialogue about what belongs to shared moral understanding? Public opinion is today heavily influenced by mass media. Yet not everyone has equal access to media, and in addition, media are owned and managed in ways that favor some groups and perspectives over others. Whether the results of such dialogues are implemented or not is unequivocally shaped by the prevailing power structure.
Moral dialogue, as a prerequisite for searching for and modifying shared moral understanding, that is, a jointly accepted set of values (Jurová, 2013), supports not only the maintenance of moral culture and ethics in a community or society, but also facilitates decision-making by state power in ethically sensitive questions. The initiation of moral dialogue is practically available to every member of a community or society, and whether the public takes up this call and whether dialogue develops depends on it. For example, if a community needs to fundamentally change social structure, moral dialogues are a suitable communicative means for generating changes in both individual and social behavior, and thus supporting public policy.
Liberals consider individuals to be the key actors who shape history. Yet if these actors are to be effective, they must, according to communitarians, necessarily be members of communities. Communities therefore play a decisive role in shaping history. Communities or collectives provide the best “antidote” not only to polarization, but also to populism, whose victims are precisely people who have lost their communities and those who feel their communities are under threat. Etzioni (2019, pp. 10–13) considers the nation, rather than local or global communities, the most important community in this context, so to achieve real and lasting change, dialogues about key values must primarily take place at the national level.
Moral dialogues as social processes, through which people create new shared moral understandings, are often passionate, disorderly, and without clear starting point or conclusion (in contrast to elections or debates), but they often lead to deep changes in the moral attitudes of those who participate in them. Although moral dialogues do not change the values of all participants, they often change the moral positions of enough people. Actions and policies that previously had little support (e.g., environmental protection), and conversely, actions and policies that many people regard as morally inappropriate, can through moral dialogues gain broad moral consensus (e.g., same-sex marriage).
Etzioni (2019, pp. 15–24) states that in the study of moral dialogues, one should start from a baseline, i.e., so-called baseline values, to show where shared moral understandings were before moral dialogues changed them. Next, one should identify the sociological “triggers” of dialogues that led to their initiation. They are usually a heightened criticism of prevailing moral culture and society and a concrete assertion of what new shared moral understanding should contain. This is followed by examining the dynamics and characteristics of moral dialogues, which can grow into intensive, highly interlinked discussions among multiple groups. These are needed for moral dialogues to take place on a large scale. To achieve shared moral understanding, processes must unfold that bring a large number of people to reconsider their moral values and adopt a new set of values as morally valid. Moral statements differ from factual rational statements, as well as from logical conclusions that can be deduced from these facts. People are emotionally engaged in moral statements, and therefore new facts or evidence-based arguments are not sufficient to change their moral attitudes. Rational deliberation concerns what “is,” while moral dialogues concern what “ought to be” and are thus based on both emotional expressions and rational reflection. Finally, an important phase of successful moral dialogues leading to shared moral understanding is effective communication of their content through dramatization. Previously mentioned mass media play a significant role here, making it possible to effectively support moral dialogues by keeping these questions in public view.
We must not forget that even when shared moral understanding changes, this will involve only a large portion of those who participated in moral dialogues, and there will naturally always be a group of people who remain with their original moral conviction. In addition, some moral dialogues fail (an example is dialogue between pro-choice and pro-life communities). Many moral dialogues take hold, develop, then slow down and are relaunched or muted again. In any case, when such dialogues take off and achieve shared moral understanding on specific issues, they can change the moral attitudes of a large part of the population and often create new moral majorities (Etzioni, 2019, p. 25). Achieving shared moral understanding enables the state to limit coercive means and rely much more on self-regulation. An example is the introduction of a public ban on smoking in dining establishments, which generated little resistance and led to general compliance with regulations because it was accompanied by public education (especially about risks of passive smoking) and moral dialogue. Although the main advantage of new shared moral understandings is increased voluntary observance of social norms that define prosocial behavior, shared moral understandings also lead to new laws and regulations or changes to them, meaning that they tend to become legally anchored.
Conclusion
Moral dialogues are dialogues about what the majority considers moral, rather than about what is moral according to a particular ethical theory. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind that even if a shared moral understanding is achieved by a community, society, or transnational community, the values that will form its content can still be perceived as immoral in the context of individual standards of persons or particular religious or ethical theories. If democracy is to endure, we will need more than mere neutrality policy and political efforts to change or shape new parties and coalitions. We will likely need a broader public discussion of culturally and ethically relevant issues. Democracy is, in fact, a form of agreement that presupposes fulfillment of shared obligations, and where these are not clearly defined, democracy suffers. A good society cannot focus only on individual freedom and rights, but must also care for the common good expressed as social responsibility toward one’s own communities and toward others.
Author: Doc. PhDr. Jarmila Maximová, PhD. The author is an associate professor at the Department of General and Applied Ethics of the Faculty of Philosophy of Comenius University in Nitra. Professionally and scientifically, she specializes in social and political philosophy and ethics, with her core interests in selected socio-philosophical conceptions. She has published several monographs and scholarly studies on theories of social justice and equality, the comparison of liberal and communitarian foundations in social and political philosophy, and the issue of their application in social practice.
This work was supported by the Agency for Supporting Research and Development on the basis of Contract No. APVV-16-0116.
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