A New Perspective on the Possibilities of Emotional Health
Introduction
In recent years, one can observe a renewed professional interest in the issue of human schemas in psychology. This fact may be conditioned by the fact that the organization of human knowledge is one of the oldest and most extensively studied areas in cognitive psychology and schema is among the most commonly used constructs for its clarification (Eysenck, Keane, 1990). Most cognitive psychologists also assume that thinking is not a mere reflection of the external environment, but an active and independent construction. Through this constructive activity of thinking, an internal cognitive representation of the world emerges (Ruisel, 2004). And this is precisely the kind of representation that schemas represent.
Schemas are usually defined in cognitive psychology as cognitive structures or frameworks that help organize and interpret information, in that they are simplified representations of perceived reality (cf. Kordačová, 2014). They are also representations that are subjective—people create schemas on the basis of personal experiences and life events they acquire along their individual life path in an effort to understand life, orient themselves in it, give it meaning, and organize acquired knowledge into meaningful wholes that then, usually unconsciously, guide each person’s thinking, experiencing, and behavior.
The construct of schema has been studied in the history of psychology and related sciences in various contexts and under different terms (in greater detail in Kordačová, 2014). Here we want to focus especially on the clinical-psychological perspective on schemas, since several important schema concepts have emerged from clinicians—especially cognitively oriented authors and therapists who most frequently encounter different forms of schema-type constructs in human thinking.
A. T. Beck (1967, 1976, 1989) belongs among the main inspirations, as one of the first to describe the development, functioning, and impact of dysfunctional schemas in a person’s life (the cognitive theory of depression and the so-called cognitive triad—negative views of self, world, and future, or depressogenic schemas). But as is well known, schemas were also studied and developed in clinical psychology under other names and concepts—for example, “object relations” in dynamic psychotherapy (e.g., the concept of introjection in Kernberg), while schemas are also used in systemic and narrative psychotherapy (deconstruction, externalization) and in strategic and communication therapy of the Palo Alto school (reframing), among others (cf. Kordačová, 2013). In this contribution, we would like in the context of new views on emotional health to present one of the latest approaches to human schemas in the form of R. L. Leahy’s theory of emotional schemas and emotional regulation.
Leahy (2002) regards the emergence of emotional schema theory as a consequence of inadequate elaboration of the place of emotions in previous cognitive schema models. In his approach, he was influenced not only by understandings of emotions by ancient philosophers (Platón, Epiktetos, Aristoteles, and others), but also by later views (e.g., Hume), romanticism, and he positively drew also from the historical dichotomization of emotions and rationality. As religious influences, Leahy mentions especially Buddhism, and among more recent views, the evolutionary approach (Cosmides, Tooby, 2002, Ermer et al., 2006) with an emphasis on the adaptive function of emotions, as well as several well-known cognitive approaches (e.g., Ellis, Harper, 1975; Clark, Beck, 2010; Lazarus, Folkmanová, 1984; Forgas, 1995; cf. Leahy, 2015, 2002). He also recalls Beck’s concept of modes (1996), Clark, Beck, and Alford’s general cognitive model (1999), theory of emotional avoidance (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, Alcaine, and Behar, 2004), and metacognitive models (Teasdale, 1999; Wells, Carter, 2001). From cognitive-interpersonal and experiential approaches, the author refers to Greenberg’s emotion-focused approach (2002) and psychodynamic models (Rogers, Freud), emphasizing the importance of catharsis, and to theories of emotional socialization (e.g., Gottman, 1996; Linehan, 1993). All these approaches were “signed off” on the final form of the author’s model of emotional schemas, including the content of its core themes and key concepts.
Basic themes and concepts of Leahy’s approach to emotional schemas
The issue of emotional schemas belongs in psychology to newer topics, and it should be noted right away that, despite its name, this is a cognitive approach to emotions. Leahy’s theory describes emotional schemas as attitudes and beliefs of an individual regarding either his or her own emotional experience, or the emotional experience of other people, as well as the assumptions people have about their ability to cope with emotions. In Leahy’s conception of emotional schemas, the central issue is how people approach emotions, what theories they construct about them, and how they respond to emotions. These individual theories are what the author calls emotional schemas (Leahy et al., 2011; Leahy, 2015, and others).
In Leahy’s approach, several definitions of emotional schemas may be encountered: as interpretations of emotions that a person experiences and behavior; or as strategies used in “working” with emotions; as individual beliefs about the causes of emotions, their legitimacy, normality, duration, tolerance, and complexity; as a way of how a person thinks about other people’s emotions and responds to them; and as plans, conceptualizations, and strategies used by the person when reacting to an experienced emotion (Leahy, 2002, 2015). These definitions demonstrate the breadth and variability of the author’s approach to emotions and are reflected in the core themes Leahy discusses in his concept.
Main themes of Leahy’s approach to emotions and emotional schemas
Leahy’s approach includes the development of several key areas and themes that relate to the broad problem of human emotionality and form the basis of both the theory and therapy of emotional schemas. The first such area and theme concerns the issue of universality of emotions, including difficult and painful emotions. This is a key theme in Leahy’s approach because it is related to emotion regulation, to an individual’s ability or inability to accept difficult emotions, and therefore to emotional health. Leahy (2015) emphasizes in his approach that painful emotions are a normal part of everyone’s life, and that their occurrence does not immediately indicate pathology. He argues that there are no good or bad emotions, just as there is no “good” or “bad” hunger; they are reactions to specific situations or evaluations of those situations, which is why emotions also change. Acceptance of difficult emotions, at the same time, reduces the tendency to judge, suppress, or escape them. Painful emotions indicate that something personally important has happened, but even high emotional intensity does not necessarily mean that life has no meaning or that there is no hope. Therefore, the goal of emotional schema therapy is not that the client should “feel well or happy,” or not experience sadness or anxiety, but rather that one should “feel everything” (p. 8). It is true that what contributes to the persistence of emotions that ultimately develop into a mental disorder is not only the experience itself, but primarily its interpretation and the strategies the person uses to deal with it. Thus, difficult emotions can lead equally to psychopathology and to adaptive life strategies.
Another theme in Leahy’s approach concerns the informational aspect of emotions and their evolutionary basis. According to Leahy, who builds on an evolutionary perspective, emotions evolved to warn us of danger and inform us about our needs. At the same time, emotions are a genetically conditioned, universal adaptation to evolutionarily significant environmental cues (Nesse, 1994; Nesse, Ellsworth, 2002, as in Leahy, 2015), which has led the author to view even negative, socially unpopular, and pathological emotions as adaptive, such as anger, aggression, agoraphobia, social phobia, jealousy, envy, and the like (cf. Leahy, 2015). The evolutionary perspective on emotions also helps in emotional schema therapy for clients to understand that these are natural reactions that make sense, need not be a source of shame, and help explain why we feel what we feel.
Another theme in Leahy’s conception concerns the connection between emotional schemas and the experience and strategies of emotion regulation in the sense that emotional schemas and coping strategies influence whether a felt emotion will persist or intensify. This assumption particularly concerns negative beliefs (schemas) about emotions (e.g., that a certain emotion such as sadness will last forever, or that felt anger cannot be managed). The concrete appraisal and interpretation of emotions also conditions the choice of coping strategies, which in turn maintain those beliefs (negative beliefs and appraisals—maladaptive coping strategies, and conversely). Leahy also considers emotions as contextual responses (they are tied to the event that triggered them), and self-awareness can help identify problems that are important from the perspective of our experience (for example, becoming aware of which goals are being threatened). An emotional reaction is therefore the result of the situation’s context and how the person interprets and evaluates it, which is also used in emotional schema therapy.
Another important theme in Leahy’s conception is emotional validation. This is the recognition of the “right” to experience a specific emotion and understanding of why the person experiences what they experience (which in interpersonal communication is not always taken for granted). Validation belongs to the central themes in Leahy’s approach because it has been shown that validation influences all other emotional schemas and is therefore a key “variable” in the theory as well as in emotional schema therapy. The interconnection of validation with other emotional schemas is expressed, for example, in that individuals who feel validated also believe that other people have the same emotions as them, that those people can express and regulate emotions, that emotions make sense, and so on, which helps normalize experience. Leahy also compares validation to the functioning of attachment, where an unsoothed infant’s crying escalates, and vice versa. In emotional schemas too, if a person expresses an unpleasant emotion expecting it to be validated (and this indeed happens), they do not feel a further need for emotional expression. Therefore, Leahy views validation as a particularly effective tool for changing emotional schemas.
A separate theme in Leahy’s approach to emotional schemas is the theme of distress tolerance, resilience, and personal growth, which has a direct link to individual emotional health. Learning to tolerate painful emotions and cultivating distress tolerance can in emotional schema therapy be understood as part of a personal growth model and strengthening, in the sense of increasing one’s sense of personal competence and more meaningful life as therapy goals. Leahy (2015) believes that therapy can be directed more productively than merely reducing negative, unpleasant experience, which is often a common request of clients entering therapy; according to him, therapy can be intentionally focused on increasing personal competence, meaning in life, and achieving desired goals, because helping clients develop a better ability to engage in challenging tasks by developing tolerance for difficult emotions strengthens them to achieve a more meaningful life. Therefore, Leahy considers it wiser to work on personal resilience rather than to set comfort as the goal, and he emphasizes willingness to endure discomfort and frustration, self-discipline, and making personal sacrifices on the path toward goals as part of the “contract.” Tolerance of discomfort can therefore become the central aim of therapy (and motivation for realizing that genuine pride is experienced when one overcomes obstacles). Emotion validation is therefore a key dimension of emotional schemas.
Dimensions of emotional schemas
Leahy elaborated these themes in greater detail in the dimensions of emotional schemas, among which, in addition to the mentioned dimension of validation, one can most importantly mention comprehensibility of emotions. This dimension refers to whether a person understands their own experience or, by contrast, is convinced that their feelings are unusual, strange, and meaningless. Poor comprehensibility of emotions is closely linked to emotional health, or its lack—it frequently appears, for example, in borderline personality disorder. The dimension of guilt or shame about experiencing certain emotions concerns the belief that a person should not have certain feelings—sexual, aggressive, depressive, and so on—and therefore tries to suppress them. These feelings are related to unhealthy parenting approaches in childhood (the issue of children’s acceptance and validation of emotions). Another dimension of emotional schemas is a simplistic view of emotions, often expressed in black-and-white schema-like thinking about emotions (either I love you or I hate you, but not both), and it refers to the ability for cognitive differentiation and complexity, which according to Leahy and colleagues (2011) reflects a higher level of the Ego (some authors call this emotional intelligence). From the perspective of emotional health, it is important to understand that a person can have mixed and complex feelings toward oneself and other people, and that this can be accepted, which also helps normalize experience.
Another dimension is the ability, or inability, to control emotions—people differ in the belief as to whether they can regulate and manage their emotions; some may feel that a strong emotion, e.g., sadness or anger, will overwhelm them and cannot be kept under control, which does not contribute to emotional health. On the contrary, such a belief is part of several mental disorders (PTSP, OCD, anxiety/depressive disorder). One of the key dimensions of emotional schemas is belief in the duration of an experienced emotion, which can vary, and like previous dimensions is related to emotional health, since it has been shown that belief in long (endless) duration, for example of fear or hopelessness, supports escalation. According to Leahy, this reflects the core difficulty of accepting the relevant emotion. Similarly, emotional numbing as an emotion regulation strategy and a dimension of emotional schemas is typical for people who cannot process intense emotions (they may fear being flooded by emotion, losing control over it, trauma, and so on), and therefore try to dull, suppress, or detach from their emotions. From the perspective of emotional health, Leahy recommends accepting one’s emotions, that is, allowing oneself to feel them and not trying to dampen them, since efforts to suppress unwanted thoughts or feelings lead to their increase. It has also been shown that accepting experience reduces anxiety and depression, and therefore this dimension also contributes to emotional health in this way. A specific dimension of emotional schemas is the demand by some people to be rational, which is tied to the belief that this is the best way to function. Excessive emphasis on rationality and logic can in fact be problematic—it may, for example, limit acceptance of a particular emotion, self-understanding, and the like. Likewise, a link has been shown between high risk in this demand and cancer, asthma, and cardiovascular diseases. Emotional schema dimensions therefore contribute significantly to the emotional health of each person, and this has also been confirmed empirically. Leahy published these findings in several studies, to which interested readers are referred (cf. Leahy, 2015).
Conclusion
Leahy’s conception of emotional schemas belongs, as far as we know, to the latest in the series of cognitive approaches to human schemas, and it is a new perspective that complements existing concepts by emphasizing the context of emotions and experience in information processing. A characteristic of Leahy’s approach is especially its focus on differences between people in emotional experience and those determined by the theories they create about experience and emotions (their own, or those of other people). Leahy’s approach is also expanded by the aspect of strategies related to these theories (beliefs) about experience that people use in an effort to manage or cope with their emotions. Leahy’s conception also emphasizes the social nature of emotions, where emotions are treated as a phenomenon that is both personal and social and that is subject to interpretation.
Our contribution does not claim to provide an exhaustive view of Leahy’s conception of emotional schemas. We focused primarily on making its key areas accessible so that readers can form a basic understanding of how this topic is valuable for both theory and practice of psychology and what new possibilities it offers for building and supporting emotional health. In this sense, Leahy’s model of personal growth and resilience can be understood as an original part of the author’s approach to emotional schemas, thanks to which one can see possibilities of emotional health (handling negative and unpleasant emotions) from the perspective of investing necessary effort and making sacrifices as a regular part of achieving goals. We believe that these perspectives can be inspiring for a new approach to emotions and their regulation, both within theoretical elaboration of various psychological contexts of human emotionality and in the approach to clients who seek professional psychological help.
PhDr. Jana Kordačová, CSc. Centrum spoločenských a psychologických vied SAV, Ústav experimentálnej psychológie SAV, Bratislava Štúdia bola podporená grantom VEGA č. 2/0048/18 Pozn.: Skrátená verzia tohto príspevku zaznela na 11. celoslovenskej konferencii Psychológia zdravia „Kam sme dospeli po 10 rokoch“ v Bratislave v r. 2016. Literatúra
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