By the end of the last century, Uzbekistan produced roughly 2.5 million tons of cotton, which represented more than 20 percent of global cotton production. Cotton cultivation supplied not only the textile industry in the Soviet Union but also the central government in the Kremlin with hard currency through exports to world markets. Yet what were the economic and especially environmental effects on the Uzbek population? Is cotton a curse for Uzbekistan, or a springboard for the country's development?
During the Soviet period, cotton plantations accounted for up to 98% of the total area designated for technical crops in Uzbekistan. The total area of plantations in the 1980s amounted to over 2 million hectares (which is 4.47% of the area of the republic), and the republic's share of cotton deliveries to enterprises of the USSR exceeded.
Corruption scandal – the “cotton case”
The distribution of profits from sales and the costs of cotton cultivation between the central government and the Uzbek SSR, however, was not equivalent. Raw cotton was exported from Uzbekistan, from which fiber, textiles, and clothing were produced in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, Islam Karimov angrily called cotton almost the main instrument of colonial exploitation of Uzbekistan by the Soviet center: ‘We get 84% of the labor costs for cotton cultivation and only 16% of the income from primary processing. Other republics that receive it have that ratio reversed: the finished shirt, woven and sewn, for example in Russia, brings colossal profits. The hard work is ours, the money is theirs. That is what it means to become a cotton base for the entire country.’
Low revenues from cotton sales were reduced even further by extensive corruption schemes. In Uzbekistan at the time, in response to the rapid increase in cotton production, a so-called cotton nomenklatura, or political elite, emerged that oversaw the decision-making process, distribution, processing, and sale of cotton. In the early 1980s in the Soviet Union, the so-called “cotton case” corruption scheme was uncovered. As a result, widespread corruption in the highest levels of Uzbek Republican leadership was exposed, leading to the arrest of many politicians and officials. The “cotton case” confirmed that state-controlled cultivation of “white gold” was attractive to narrow interest groups, which were gaining real gold through the black-market sale of raw cotton.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan avoided the transition to a market economy and the associated shock therapy. The vast majority of key sectors (energy, mining, agriculture, etc.) are still under state monopoly control. Today, Uzbekistan produces about two-thirds of all cotton produced in Central Asia. Cotton still plays an important role in the economy, and despite the obvious decline in production after the fall of the Soviet Union, it remains one of the sources of foreign currency revenues. Important is the shift occurring in the Uzbek economy as it seeks to diversify its export income sources. Unprocessed cotton therefore fell from 60% to 5% in 1991–2015.
Other important items therefore became, for example, processed fiber and textiles, whose exports brought revenues of 1.32 billion USD. This is why Uzbekistan is trying to distance itself from the Soviet model, in which fiber processing and textile manufacturing took place outside the territory of the then socialist republic, moving from a purely raw-fiber export model to diversified production that yields greater profit.
Ecological catastrophe: the disappearance of the Aral Sea
Any account of cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan cannot avoid mentioning one of the greatest ecological catastrophes of the twentieth century: the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan’s semi-desert areas under continental climate conditions required an enormous amount of water. Water for irrigating fields was transported from the two major Central Asian rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, through an extensive irrigation canal network, whose length today is 28,000 km. As a result of intensive irrigation, the Aral Sea shrank to 15% of its original area, and as a result its former seabed, covering 40,000 square kilometers, became land and is now known as Aralkum.
Key consequences of the Aral Sea drying include, for example, dust storms containing large amounts of salts, pesticides, and fertilizers, which have immediate impacts on economic activity, public health, and ecosystems in adjacent areas. From an ecosystem that once served as the home to 12 endemic fish species and the main source of income in the region, it became a zone of ecological catastrophe. Famously, photographs of ships lying on the former sea floor are known worldwide. These are remains of the fishing fleet that used to deliver 40,000 tons of fish each year to the largest processing factory in the Soviet Union.
Consequences for ecosystems and community health
The emergence of Aralkum contributed not only to a drastic transformation of ecosystems, extinction of native species, and soil salinization, but also to local climate change. As late as the 1960s, the Aral Sea served as the only climate regulator at the local level. Now residents of nearby areas experience much more intense temperature fluctuations and continental climate conditions that were previously moderated by the presence of the sea.
The worst possible consequence of this drastic transformation of the Aral Sea is the health impact on communities living in the Karakalpak region. Local residents have a 3.5-times higher prevalence of DNA damage because they are exposed to deposition of salts and pesticides from the exposed bed of the Aral Sea. Nearly all residents of Karakalpak suffer from anemia: 87% of adolescents, 91% of non-pregnant women, and 99% of pregnant women.
Banning cotton cultivation is not the solution
Cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan is an illustrative example of a development problem for which there is no universal solution. The existing system is characterized by widespread human rights violations, ecological devastation in the Aral Sea area, undemocratic governance, gender inequality, labor outmigration, persistent differences between rural and urban areas, and an economic system inherited from the Soviet Union.
There is no clear answer to how to approach solving this problem. Banning cotton cultivation appears to be the simplest solution, but it is not feasible in practice. Cotton remains a source of hard-currency revenues needed to finance further industrial sectors, industrialization, and import-substitution policies. As a result of such use of funds, economic growth is pulling Uzbekistan’s economy toward the best outcomes in the region. A debatable question, however, is whether such growth is socially fair, inclusive, and sustainable in the long term.
From the author’s perspective, this economic growth does not meet those criteria, because environmental externalities and the use of forced labor are not included in it. In addition, this growth is dependent on the current status quo in global cotton consumption and is affected by price volatility.
Cotton can serve as a basis for development
Refusing the transition to a market economy and liberalization helped Uzbekistan preserve the status quo in cotton production and retain this form of industry. In this it differs from some African states that chose this path and today struggle with national economic problems due to chaotic foreign investments aimed at rapidly extracting profit. Uzbekistan has suitable climatic conditions for cotton cultivation, sufficient water resources on condition of sustainable management, and also a large amount of know-how and local knowledge. These two premises allow us to say that cotton can serve as a foundation for development, but for that to materialize, real changes in the economy and social structure are needed.
But it is not possible to rely only on cotton and the stable returns it brings. The current political system has not undergone democratization since the fall of the Soviet Union. Many social problems stem from the inertia preserved by Islam Karimov’s authoritarian policy. These include quotas for cotton cultivation, widespread corruption, and forced labor carried out through loud ideological slogans.
Necessary solutions at the political level
For achieving real change in the sector, the first solution appears at the political level. Uzbekistan should, in the first step, allow democratic elements in society, speak out loudly about problems, and get rid of state ideology. An anti-corruption drive should be the next step, bringing visible relief to the economy and society. Immediate attention should be given to raising wages in the agricultural sector, which could help reverse migration trends in the region.
The very way cotton is grown must undergo modernization and reconstruction of irrigation systems, as Uzbek fields require multiple times more water than in other cotton-exporting states. Uzbekistan should begin transitioning to the cultivation of organic cotton without pesticides and enormous amounts of fertilizers. This precondition, however, cannot be fulfilled without changes at the global level, where organic cotton is currently at a price disadvantage.
Cotton itself is not a curse for Uzbekistan; rather, the curse is the rigid political system that allowed all of the development deficits described above to emerge. Gradual economic and political reforms can jump-start an economy characterized by sustainable and inclusive economic growth that respects the environment and human rights. The current political situation indicates a revival and slow reforms with the arrival of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the presidential office. The open question, however, remains whether Uzbek society and the environment have time for slow reforms.
Text: Štěpán Vaškevič, Photo: Anti-Slavery International The author is a master's student in International Development Studies at Univerzitě Palackého v Olomouci. He is an editor at the portal Zajímej.se, the first Czech media about circular economy. He is from Belarus and his professional and academic interests also include the development trajectories of former Soviet bloc states. Note: Tento článok bol vytvorený v rámci predmetu Rozvojové príležitosti Str. Asie na Katedre rozvojových a environmentálnych štúdií PrF UP v Olomouci (pod dohľadom Dr. S. Šafaříkovej a Dr. B. Markovič Baluchovej)