Crowds in Arab countries are often dangerous: passionate, uncontrollable. And for that reason, people often die in them, mostly from trampling. This one was not like that.
I stood in line for two hours. Altogether, there were three rows, ending in a personal inspection. At mine, with special attention, they checked my passport and asked why I was going to Tahrir at that very time, when the revolution was taking place. In the end, they let me in. Personal inspections were also done for everyone else. Children, the elderly, women in veils, but also those dressed in a European way. People in suits, and even the poorest. Everyone hoped to be able to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak. From our perspective, he looked like a dictator who was still tolerable. He had guaranteed Israel's security, offered Europeans cheap holidays, and kept the Islamists in check. Inside the country, which has 80 million inhabitants, more than half of whom are younger than 30, things looked different. Economic power had been in the hands of the army and a clique around the president. Young people had nowhere to work. If they wanted to start a business, they were not granted credit. That was reserved for the elite. If someone spoke out, the secret police tortured them or put them in jail. That is why the revolution came.
From Mubarak to the army
People on Tahrir were not so much concerned with politics; they did not understand it, because no one had discussed it with them. They only wanted a dignified life and believed they could achieve it in Tahrir. It was not an angry mob. Even in chants about Mubarak, there was mostly hope. They sensed that change was within reach. That change truly came, and the army took over power. Yet this is only a small shift—the army was where Mubarak and his predecessors came from. The army had governed economically even before; it owns huge assets and factories in which conscripts work for free. The generals decided that if they continued to stand behind Mubarak, they could lose power, and they did not want that. So they began to govern, and avoided speaking boldly about democracy. That was supposed to come “someday,” which was not enough for people from Tahrir—they wanted a precise date. They got one: parliamentary elections at the turn of the year, presidential elections in May 2012.
“We suddenly have a precise schedule; we knew when the army would hand over power. It is no longer like in the old regime, where we were promised reforms were being worked on, but in reality nothing was happening,” said Egyptian publicist Tarík Osman to the newspaper SME. A few months before the revolution, he wrote a book in which he predicted the changes.
However, disturbing news started coming from Egypt. Tens of thousands of people returned to Tahrir, this time demanding the army’s departure, which was only slowly transferring power. Demonstrators again spoke of arrests for expressing an opinion, of censorship. They said this was the same as under Mubarak. When nearly 80 people died at a football match in Port Saíd in January this year, the generals were immediately blamed. The victims were ultras of a Cairo club, who are the strongest critics of the generals’ rule. Worse for Egypt’s stability, this was not entirely an unfair accusation against the army: it is in the army’s interest to show that Egypt will not last without it. The unrest suits it, because the army is then the force that has to suppress it. The only alternative is the police, which discredited itself during the revolution when it intervened violently against the protests. The streets were then brought under military control, and the army thereby built an image of itself as the protector of the revolution.
What will matter most is who keeps power
In reality, however, the army is concerned with protecting its own privileges. That is why it negotiates with the parties over what will remain in its hands. It wants to keep tax exemptions and, above all, obtain guarantees that none of the generals will ever have to answer in the future for crimes from Mubarak’s era or from the ongoing transition period. Many Europeans are cheering the army on, so much are they afraid of Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood, who dominated parliament. They would like to see more liberals, who had dominated on Tahrir. Yet this did not lead to forming sufficiently strong political parties, while Islamists have been functioning for decades, even though until now only underground. Several current deputies were even in prison before the revolution. Osman says one cannot speak of a monolithic Islamist group. Even among them there are different views that will soon begin to surface. “Even inside the party there are conservative and liberal people. What matters is not whom people elect now, but who keeps power,” he says. According to him, young Egyptians long for openness, and for the future this gives greater chances to secular parties. “The greatest story currently unfolding in Egypt is the transfer of power from old middle-class structures to young people. A new Egypt is being formed,” added Osman.
It still cannot yet be said what kind of Egypt this will be. It is an experiment whose results will become known only in a few years, maybe decades.
Matúš Krčmárik The author is an editor of the newspaper SME
The article was published in the bulletin Development aid - Spring 2012. It is issued by Platforma mimovládnych rozvojových organizácií (MVRO), which is an association of legal entities, the umbrella organization of 31 (23 regular members and 8 observers) Slovak nongovernmental organizations that deal mainly with foreign development and humanitarian aid. http://www.mvro.sk
The complete issue of the magazine Rozvojová pomoc - spring 2012 in PDF