The Phenomenon of Moral Imagination in the area of Social Work Ethics as a philosophical discipline is a practical science of applying love and wisdom in concrete life. If we are ethicists, we are also somewhat psychologists. Contemporary interdisciplinarity does not let us go, and that is also why ethics is so topical and sought after today. Globalization and postmodern society have placed various ethnicities and different moral starting points side by side, and our thinking must stand in the polarities of reason and emotion. An inseparable element of thinking is imagination and sensitivity. By combining philosophy, psychotherapy, social work and current basic knowledge of imagination, we find ourselves in the field of new inspirations. By using imagination we can address conflicts, process them on a symbolic level. At this point we are still in the sphere of safety and creativity as a tool for creating new possibilities of resolution. By "casting off" symbols, however, we pass into reality, which already feels to a significant degree our mistakes or the consequences of actions and decisions for which we are forced to bear responsibility in reality.
That is our future – not only intrapsychic, interpersonal, but also behavior towards the world in general. We present the necessity of applying moral imagination not only in the Slovak philosophical and ethical community, but mainly in every sphere of human activity, action and decision-making. We present it as a means of coordination and a tool for change in solving procedures in personal and work relationships, procedures and advances in science and technology, as well as visions of the whole society and its future.
Applied Ethics and Imagination in Social Work "Sensitivity in action is mercy in practice." Anthony de Mello
The applied ethicist acts as a manager, an expert in working not only with tangible or intangible goods, but in every case it is work with people and about people. The art of empathy and anticipation thus remains in place. The basic equipment of a manager – whether an applied ethicist or a social worker – must therefore also be supplemented by knowledge from psychology. They should possess the ability to absorb various psychological phenomena and specific situations. Often they are not aware of the phenomena they use in their work, nor do they name them. The current state does not present a theoretical elaboration of the topic, nor the complexity of the question of moral imagination/sensitivity in Slovakia. The situation is such that the term "imagination" is used in professional literature (especially in psychology and psychotherapy), but the term "moral imagination" is a common part of the work of applied ethicists only in the USA and Canada. The cognizability of imagination as a whole enables us, but also partially facilitates, its transfer and use in the field of ethics known to us. It is precisely its deeper description and more detailed understanding that should help us "non-psychologists" better bridge it into ethical practice.
Applied ethics has an interdisciplinary nature. "The term interdisciplinary is understood here simply as interaction between two or more disciplines, whereby this approach should vary from a simple exchange of views to mutual integration of methodologies, concepts, procedures, terminologies." (P. Fobel, In: Fobelová, D., 2005, s. 60). Synonyms and the multitude of meanings also testify to the interdisciplinarity of the term - imagination. By combining psychology and philosophy we can conclude that imagination helps to arrive, through the meaning of experience and knowledge, at understanding, which is essential for achieving a state where people can find meaning in the world. In ethics, in practice, it is depicted as a tool of anticipation and sensitivity. We speak of feeling as a "special form of reflection of reality." "Feelings are genetically determined, but are formed under the influence of society; they have an immense role in human behavior, in practical and cognitive activity." (see Philosophical Dictionary). An important fact emerges here: without human feelings, the human search for truth never existed, does not exist, and will not exist. "Feelings have an important role in the regulation of human activity, because they are signals of its success or failure, of whether objects and phenomena correspond or do not correspond to human needs and interests." (see Philosophical Dictionary). In the practical application of ethics, the phenomenon of imagination is presented precisely through feeling and sensitivity.
We encounter sensitivity already in David Hume. Hume's ethical conception was based on the morality of sentiment. He devoted great attention precisely to human feelings and within them to moral sentiments. His theory of moral sentiment is characterized by a clear dominance of sentiment, which was decisive in determining what is right and wrong. Sentiment and humanity are "the foundation of all social virtues, that is, virtues which constitute a very essential basis of all human morality." (Gluchman V., 1999, s. 52). It was precisely Hume's philosophical themes that contained approaches that "enriched the moral life of the individual through the acceptance of human feelings, which they considered an important part of the individual's moral effort to achieve happiness and self-improvement. They considered moral feelings to be compatible with the effort to achieve the utility of human action." (Gluchman V., 1999, s. 55). The theory of moral sentiment culminated in the conception of utilitarianism, but we also find connections in the ethics of social consequences, where – "the relationship to reality is maintained especially at the level of analysis of relations of various types of moral subjects to generalized kinds of contemporary moral problems, for example the problem of environmental threats, interpersonal relations, nationalism, unemployment, etc." (Gluchman V., 1999, s. 56). This creates space for moral feelings and their acceptance in ethics – in its practical orientation. The philosophical conception of Hume's theory of moral sentiment is further developed by John Dewey. The phenomenon of moral sensitivity is connected with moral perceptiveness and subsequently with moral imagination. Dewey says: "Hypotheses are valuable only insofar as they make the human mind more sensitive to the surrounding life. In an absolutely temporalized intellectual world, the deepening of this sensitivity will be as respectable a goal for an academic discipline as contributing to knowledge." (R. Rorty, 2006, s. 53). Sensitivity – its use, thus places it at the level of human knowledge. Man is a thinking and feeling being. Whether we want it or not – the final judgment is composed of both rational and emotional assessment of the situation.
The model of ethical thinking and decision-making is built on moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral intention and moral behavior. We thus understand imagination as a process of thinking, where psychologists, as well as applied ethicists led by Patricia Werhane, further describe the composition of moral imagination.
Its structure consists of four decisive processes (Moberg, Seabright, 2000, s. 847):
- moral sensitivity,
- moral judgment,
- moral intention,
- moral behavior.
Following David Hume and Adam Smith, Patricia Werhane presents the current conception of moral imagination through the analysis of imagination. It is necessary to distinguish between three types of moral representations (P. Werhane, In: Moberg J.D., Seabright A.M., 2000, s. 848): I. reproductive imagination – awareness of context, schema, description and possible moral conflicts and dilemmas; II. productive imagination – consists in improving the schema, taking into account new possibilities within the situation, problem; III. creative imagination – speaks of the ability to imagine and realize possibilities that are not dependent on the original context, it is a project of a new schema, to imagine and evaluate new possibilities of solution and their consequences.
In a simple interpretation this means:
- actual description of the situation;
- improvement of its schema, production of new possibilities for solving the situation;
- application of newly created possibilities and their subsequent evaluation.
At this point it is also important to present the stance of the pragmatists. Pragmatists, led by R. Rorty, seek only one answer – usefulness: "Useful from the perspective of a better future. Better in the sense that there will be more of what we consider good and less of what we consider bad." According to R. Rorty, the moral development of the individual and the moral progress of the human race as a whole are related "to the reclassification of the human 'Self' so that the relationships constituting this 'Self' become more diverse. The ideal limit of the growth of this diversity is the 'Self' contained in Christian and Buddhist descriptions of holiness – it is the ideal 'Self' that experiences the hunger and suffering of every person (indeed even every animal) as intense pain. If this process were completed, the term 'morality' would fall out of language. For then it would be neither possible nor necessary to contrast natural and moral action. Then we would all possess Kant's 'holy will', Rorty thinks. The more we identify with those we help, the more we mention them when we tell the stories of our own 'Self', the more their story is also our story, the less appropriate the concept of 'moral duty' becomes." (E. Gál, 2007 In: SME (Fórum)). Thus we gradually move towards the question of the use and application of moral sensitivity. Therefore, it will be best to think of moral progress as a question of increasing sensitivity, deepening the ability to respond to the needs of increasingly diverse people and things. "We cannot focus on 'right action', because we will never know if it was such. But we can aim for ever greater sensitivity to suffering, ever better satisfaction of ever more diverse needs." (R. Rorty, 2006, s. 40). Moral progress is a fact of ever more widely perceived compassion. Our goal cannot be moral perfection, but it can be our ability to take into account the needs of more people than before. It is questionable whether we can truly empathize with the needs of people.
We speak of imagination, that is, of sensitivity. Both terms appear as synonyms, which in applied ethics present the ability to anticipate, to empathize with a given situation, to create new, or better, or more correct decision-making attitudes. In the words of R. Rorty, "an act of imaginary sympathy." R. Rorty introduces this term as the ability to imagine the most ideal path of solution, presenting the idea of the "good life." We can thus express questions of social work and the need for the application of ethics and its elements in the sphere of activity of social workers through the thoughts of Edmund Burke, who says that if it were not for the gift of moral imagination, we would be nothing but "barbarians with a cold heart." At this point, the idea of the interconnectedness of social work and applied ethics arises when we speak precisely of human dignity. We thus designate moral imagination as the power of ethical perception, as a step that arises from personal experience and current activity. It is precisely imagination that informs us about the dignity of human nature, and which teaches us "that we are more than a naked ape." Moral imagination belongs inseparably to the discourse of applied ethics in social work, because it enables managers to grasp mental models, and thus influence their perception and decision-making. Imagination therefore appears as a cognitive process that includes an emphasis on the social process. Individual moral imagination contains the integration of moral sensitivity with regard to the collective, to social dynamics. Moral outcomes arise from social processes. Since moral imagination involves consideration of social processes, we understand it as a social process, and present it as a tool of institutional change. It follows that moral imaginations can enter into various forms of ethical decision-making. Everything ultimately results in serious geopolitical and social consequences.
Moral theory provides us with adequate criteria for moral judgments, evaluation of decisions and actions. Despite their knowledge of ethical theories, even intelligent and reasonable people make moral mistakes. These mistakes cannot be attributed to a lack of ignorance, but often to a lack of moral imagination – sensitivity.
Moral imagination is increasingly perceived within applied ethics as an important tool for implementing ethics in connection with the creation of case studies. It appears as the main means of self-reflection, it is one of the ways to be morally responsible. Moral imagination is about integrating moral sensitivity into every social process with regard to its dynamics. The goal is to apply moral imagination to solving internal and external conflicts, to evaluating case studies, but also to use it in practicing and acquiring moral requirements and as a tool for justifying and clarifying the applicability of norms and principles. It is a tool of ethical reasoning and action for the social worker.
Author: Mgr. Lucia Litvová Faculty of Humanities, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica
List of Bibliographic References
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The lecture was presented at the international scientific conference Applied Ethics in Social Work and Other Helping Professions, which took place on 20–21 October 2010, in Piešťany and was published in the proceedings of this conference: MÁTEL, A. – SCHAVEL, M. – MÜHLPACHR, P. – ROMAN, T. 2010. Aplikovaná etika v sociálne práci a ďalších pomáhajúcich profesiách. Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie. Bratislava : VŠZaSP sv. Alžbety. 413 s. ISBN 978-80-89271-89-4.