Social policy today cannot avoid searching for the interconnections between social justice and equality or inequality in a democratic society. We believe that the strongest motive for the exercise of power – and not only in politics – is the real or perceived existence of inequality. Genuine equality in society is much more complicated to find, because "when people call for equality, they are in fact demanding equality concerning a specific thing or things."(1) These are mostly demands rooted in the confrontation of specific categories within a single group or between more or less comparable categories. People are essentially seeking relative rather than absolute equality. In an effort to gain power, they strive to preserve a certain equality or inequality, or they want to receive more equalities or inequalities than they already have. As Smith notes in this regard, the justification of inequalities in one area (e.g., income or wealth) appeals to equality in another area (e.g., equal right to work and its products or equal pay for equal work).(2)
Another possible candidate for priority within political motivations is freedom, which ultimately led to the equality proclaimed today in the area of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In the social and economic sphere, equality is much more debatable. Inequalities in these areas are, in our view, natural, yet there is also a certain tendency to eliminate these inequalities because they may be considered unjustified. This only confirms the evident connection and close interrelationship between the issue of equality and inequality and the question of social justice.
We consider justice in this context as a moral and political concept that can be applied to some or all of the three stages of an act: intention, the act itself, and the outcome. In principle, no definition or theory of justice can be considered complete without relating it to a certain concept of equality. Justice is very closely linked to equality not only because of "fair and non-arbitrary treatment of equals"(3), but it is also the first prerequisite of morality. Every human being is a moral person who, according to Rawls, is characterized by two features(4): each is capable of forming, revising, and rationally pursuing their own conception of the good, and each is capable of having a sense of justice. By one's own conception of the good, in the context of Rawls's theory of justice, we mean what a given person considers valuable for their own personal life. The sense of justice includes the ability to judge things or actions as right or wrong. In both cases, these are natural attributes of the person. Thus, the issue of justice and equality should not be discussed only in a political context, but also in a philosophical and moral context.(5) Every theory of justice is thus directly dependent on and derived from a specific ideological and moral worldview. This also determines whether we place justice at the level of intentions, actions, or consequences.
Within contemporary social philosophy, the concept of equality and social justice of the already cited American social and political philosopher of the second half of the 20th century, John Rawls, is particularly interesting in this regard. In the context of his theory of social justice, we will therefore point out selected aspects of legitimate equalities and inequalities within social justice, or within a just society in general.
Society or social reality can, for the purposes of this text, be defined together with Wolff as a collective human product that is distinct from the objective natural world. It is thus the total sum of feelings, expectations, customs, patterns of interaction, and beliefs of the men and women who constitute society.(6) The existence and persistence of society requires a systematic hypostatization and objectivization of the subjective. Social justice in general requires that every individual have equal civil rights to security and freedom, and equal democratic political rights. In liberal-democratic societies, these requirements are supplemented by equality of opportunity, especially in the areas of education and employment.(7) Rawls's conception of social justice is today undoubtedly the subject of many socio-political debates. Rawls's first principle of social justice – the principle of equality – guarantees equal basic liberties and subsequently fair equality of opportunity. The second principle regulates the social and economic sphere and is known as the difference principle. Together, these principles complement each other and are applied within institutions. Justice is thus understood as a significant "virtue of the basic institutions"(8) of society.
In the context of the examined issue, we will first outline the various kinds of equality that social justice requires, and later move to the analysis of the distribution of social and economic goods and burdens, which is based on the difference principle as a principle of distributive justice.
What equality, then, does social justice require? First and foremost, it demands for every individual equal civil rights to security and freedom, as well as equal democratic political rights. Social justice thus essentially requires a "liberal state – a state that respects and protects the security and freedom of individuals."(9) This means that the exercise of social justice requires a free market and a minimal state. On the other hand, it should be noted that such a system would produce enormous inequalities in income, wealth, welfare, opportunities, economic and political power, which would be, as many opponents of liberalism argue, unjust. Equal democratic political rights guarantee the individual the right to vote and the right to run for public office, as well as the rights to freedom of political expression and association.(10)
Another kind of equality required by social justice is formal and fair equality of opportunity, which opens many fundamental political questions, as it relates to equality and freedom. No law may prevent an individual from striving to achieve their own legitimate goals that correspond to their own possibilities and abilities. However, this is not sufficient to achieve equality of opportunity. There are certain limitations of a serious nature: lack of education, prejudice, insufficient family background, etc., so the ideal of equal opportunities can only be applied in the initial phase, at the so-called "starting line" – after that, everyone is the architect of their own fortune.
Formal equality of opportunity requires the elimination of discrimination on irrelevant grounds, such as skin color, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. "This means that social justice might not require a free market, but rather state intervention in the form of anti-discrimination legislation that outlaws discrimination on irrelevant grounds."(11) Such legislation, however, is widely accepted as a necessity of social justice in modern liberal democracies. Fair equality of opportunity goes even further, however, and requires an equal opportunity to become qualified or an equal starting line for competitors so that the competition is fair. This is also consistent with Rawls's conception of justice as fairness. The role of government is to legalize opportunities, such as the state's duty to ensure access to education, or the benefit of social security, housing, and healthcare. "Thus, social justice, in order to achieve equality of opportunity, requires not only a liberal-democratic state, but also a welfare state."(12) Such an understanding of justice might sound egalitarian, yet it also "allows certain exceptions to equality, if these serve, for example, as a stimulus for the production of a higher quantity of goods to be redistributed to the poor."(13)
Communist countries that attempted to eliminate unjust inequalities to the lowest possible degree through state control, planned economy, and directive management of production and distribution ultimately found that this system of state governance did not eliminate vast economic inequalities in practice, but rather enabled and even encouraged vast political inequalities and suppressed freedom. Moreover, production evidently declined, so a free market favoring individual freedom over equality in distribution is likely more efficient than a planned economy. Naturally, certain inequalities arise here, but the task of the state is to appropriately regulate the free market and create systemic measures to prevent injustice. However, the free market is not the only source of inequality among people in society. We must not forget human nature, and thus the fact that we are born neither with the same genetic predispositions, abilities, and talents, nor into the same family and social environment.
Another kind of equality that we must not forget in this context is equality of conditions. The question actually arises whether social justice requires equality or rather inequality of conditions. One of the most frequently discussed aspects of inequality is its distribution: "In a healthy society, inequalities in political or economic power are far less dangerous to its stability provided they are arranged from the lowest to the highest categories and the division between rich and poor, between the powerful and the ruled, is mediated by a vast and easily permeable middle class."(14)
Inequality of conditions refers to inequalities in income, wealth, work and leisure time, and the resulting inequalities in living standards and welfare.(15) We believe this is the most controversial aspect of social justice, because inequality of conditions has both many arguments in its favor and many unacceptable consequences. People should have the freedom to do what they want with their abilities and money, but this can result from unequal conditions.
The argument for inequality of conditions in assessing what is socially just and what is unjust is that the skills of some people contribute to greater production, therefore they deserve more than others. Another argument for economic inequality is also that unequal incomes can compensate for unequal burdens, although market incomes usually do not do this (e.g., people who have dangerous, health-threatening, or otherwise disadvantaged jobs deserve more money for doing them – or perhaps not?). Furthermore, inequality of conditions has good consequences for society as a whole, not only for its relatively advantaged members. According to Rawls's difference principle, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they bring the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.(16) This principle thus requires that – however large – inequalities in wealth and income always effectively contribute to the good of the least advantaged members of society – otherwise such inequalities are unacceptable. Existing inequalities are to satisfy the condition of contributing to the good of ourselves as well as others, so the difference principle is in fact a principle of reciprocity.(17)
On the other hand, there are also many arguments for equality of conditions.(18) Large inequalities in income and wealth cause inequalities in social status and social prestige. Economic and social inequalities also cause inequality in physical and mental health and affect life expectancy across the socio-economic spectrum. Moreover, large economic inequalities give some people power over the lives of others, as well as unequal political power and influence. They also cause unequal starting positions, opportunities, and unfair competition, which we have already mentioned.
Large economic inequalities thus result in inequalities in social status, position and public recognition, in health, life expectancy, economic and political power, in opportunities, and in the share of the common product of society. Each of these inequalities can be considered unjust because they make disadvantaged people even more disadvantaged than they would necessarily have to be. Large economic inequalities also harm society as a whole, because they produce suboptimal levels of wealth, health, life expectancy, violent crime, and solidarity. Does this mean that social justice requires not only equality in civil and political rights and fair equality of opportunity, but also equality of conditions?
Rawls, who is often accused of inclining toward egalitarianism, does not think so. He emphasizes the moment of freedom and equality simultaneously, because both freedom and equality are important in understanding such a variable concept as social justice. He does not place the principles of equality and inequality in an exclusionary relationship; quite the opposite: he understands them as two closely interconnected principles in a society we consider socially just. Even in a society where economic inequality among its members prevails, according to Rawls's difference principle, inequality is justified only if it is to the benefit of the least advantaged. "Ultimately, this means that it leads to elimination through the improvement of the life situation of the least advantaged and their participation in the life of society."(19)
In connection with the current global economic crisis, I would like to note that today many discussions are being held about implementing some elements of the welfare state into the functioning of liberal-democratic societies, about introducing fair rules for the redistribution of incomes and the reduction of individualism. Rawls's conception of social justice is the subject of much debate, and it is not clear whether and how it could be translated into real political practice. In this respect, his theory is often confronted with the new communitarian conception of a just pluralist society, which emerged in modern societies at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Although the communitarian platform is very extensive, communitarians fundamentally agree that it is impossible to find a common concept of the good for the whole of society. The problem of the universalist validity of norms and their particularist foundation arises here. At this point, I refrain from a deeper analysis of the communitarian concept of justice and the good, but I identify with the communitarian conviction that an atomized and materialistic consumer society is risky and unsustainable.
In conclusion, I would venture to state that placing too much emphasis on individual autonomy and suppressing the importance of community as the foundation of the global economy and modern politics causes a decline in citizen interest and participation in the functioning of democratic societies. The result of individualistic solipsism is "less democracy," or a kind of social exclusion of entire strata of society. Short-term and superficial private individualism in the era of globalization threatens not only the stability of liberal democracies, but also the space for further (multicultural?) integration. Rawls, as one of the few liberals, understood that a just society cannot be purely liberal, but must also contain elements of the welfare state, so it should be socially oriented.
References: Goodwin, B.: Using Political Ideas. West Sussex: John Wiley& Sons, Ltd, 2007. ISBN 978-0-470-02552-9. Jurová, J.: Možný vplyv Marxa na Rawlsovo chápanie slobody a rovnosti. In: Sapík, M. – Pavličíková, H. – Kondra, P. – Blaščíková, A. – Jurová, J. – Teplan, D.: Etika a postmoderna. Nitra: UKF, 2009. ISBN 978-80-8094-488-9, s. 89 – 122. Jurová, J.: Sociálna spravodlivosť podľa Johna Rawlsa. Boskovice: Vydavatelství František Šalé –ALBERT, 2011. ISBN 978-80-7326-210-5. Krieger, J. (ed.): Oxfordský slovník světové politiky. Praha: OTTOVO NAKLADATELSTVÍ s.r.o, 2000. ISBN 80-7181-463-6. Miller, D. – Coleman, J. – Connoly, W. – Ryan, A. (eds.): Blackwellova encyklopedie politického myšlení. Brno: Barrister and Principal, 2003. ISBN 80-85947-56-0 Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1971. ISBN 0-674-88014-5. Rawls, J.: Justice as Fairness. A Restatement. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harward University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-674-00511-2. Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. ISBN 978-0-230-55276-0. Všeobecná deklarácia ľudských práv. Available online: http://www.dostojnost.eu/Vseobecna_deklaracia_ludskych_prav.pdf (19-12-2012) Wolff, R. P.: Understanding Rawls. A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-691-01992-4.
Author: PhDr. Jarmila Jurová, PhD. Department of General and Applied Ethics Faculty of Arts, Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra
Notes: (1) Krieger, J. (ed.): Oxfordský slovník světové politiky, p. 731. (2) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, p. 115. (3) Goodwin, B.: Using Political Ideas, p. 417. (4) Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice, pp. 41, 442, 444. (5) For more detail, see Jurová, J.: Sociálna spravodlivosť podľa Johna Rawlsa, pp. 87 – 94. (6) Wolff, R. P.: Understanding Rawls. A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice, p. 123. (7) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, p. 119. (8) Rawls, J.: Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, p. 61. (9) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, p. 117. (10) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives." (Art. 21). (11) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, p. 118. (12) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, p. 119. (13) Miller, D. – Coleman, J. – Connoly, W. – Ryan, A. (eds.): Blackwellova encyklopedie politického myšlení, p. 480. (14) Krieger, J. (ed.): Oxfordský slovník světové politiky, p. 733. (15) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, p. 121. (16) Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice, p. 83. (17) Rawls, J.: Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, p. 64. (18) Smith, P.: Moral and Political Philosophy. Key Issues, Concepts and Theories, pp. 124 – 127. (19) Jurová, J.: Možný vplyv Marxa na Rawlsovo chápanie slobody a rovnosti, p. 101.