Friedrich August von Hayek is a proponent of negative liberal freedom, and he sees one of the main causes of the current problems of liberal societies in Cartesian, that is, constructive reason. The main shortcoming of this reason is that it dares, consciously and deliberately, to create new social structures or rules of conduct with which it seeks to replace the basic, spontaneously emerging negative rules of human conduct. Hayek criticizes Cartesian reason in that it is directed mainly toward the defense of negative freedom, which is made possible by the negative character of those rules of conduct that emerge spontaneously. If rules of conduct had a positive character—that is, if by their content they also determined what the individual ought to do—then we would have the opposite of a free society. (1)
A key position in Hayek’s social and political thought is the freedom of the individual. In The Constitution of Liberty (1960) he defines it as “the absence of an obstacle—compulsion by other people.”(2) Hayek therefore means by the term free person an individual who can think, act, and live according to his own ideas without being forced by someone else to think, act, or live in another way—simply, without someone else violently restricting his freedom. On such a defined freedom, every person naturally has a right, assuming that he respects and does not limit the freedom of other people. This understanding of freedom is what we call negative freedom, because it is negatively defined as the absence of compulsion. (3) This is exactly how individual freedom was defined in political liberalism and applied to the economic sphere in the form of non-interference of the state in the economy. The natural consequence that follows from this approach is an emphasis on individual responsibility, on rules, on their observance by individuals, and on limiting coercive mechanisms only to cases where those rules are violated. These are the basic principles of the rule of law state with minimal governmental scope. (4)
Hayek’s definition of freedom depends on the meaning of a certain concept of coercion, so at this point it is necessary to clarify what the term coercion means for Hayek. He understands it as such control over the environment or conditions of one individual by another individual that the latter is compelled to act not according to his own plan, but to serve the goals of someone else. Coercion is evil because it eliminates the individual as a thinking and judging being and turns him into an instrument for achieving someone else’s goal. It should also be noted, however, that some form of coercion cannot be avoided, since this is the only way to prevent it—the threat of coercion. (5)
In modern open society, the state takes on this role by defining the private sphere of individuals and protecting it from interference by others. Freedom requires that the individual be able to pursue his own goals, and for a free person it allows freedom of individual decision-making through the delimitation of special personal rights and the designation of spheres in which each individual can independently dispose of resources available to him in the interest of achieving his own goals. The most important thing is that for each person a “recognizable free sphere” is reserved. (6) This means that the basis for an individual’s achievement of goals is having something of one’s own (even if only a little). The general assumption that this kind of freedom can exist without limitation (7) fails here, and in this context we agree with Hayek that general freedom is more or less impossible because each person’s freedom would collapse into unlimited freedom, that is, the absence of constraints by everyone else.
Freedom as the absence of coercion is thus a kind of freedom, that is, a state in which a person is not forced to serve the will of another person. “This coercion includes both the threat of causing harm and the intention to achieve certain conduct by means of it.”(8) Manda in this context writes that for Hayek freedom must be defined as such freedom of an individual’s action that is limited by general law, valid for everyone equally. (9) These laws are, in effect, the gradually formed rules of modern society, which have an abstract and negative, that is, mainly prohibitive, character, thereby delineating the individual’s (private) spheres of free action.
How can we guarantee the greatest possible freedom for everyone? Hayek argues that this can be secured through a uniform limitation of everyone’s freedom by abstract rules that prevent other people from exerting arbitrary and discriminatory pressure on someone, or anyone from using such pressure against him. These rules further prevent anyone from attacking anyone else’s free sphere. (10) Shared specific goals are therefore replaced by shared abstract rules. The role of government is to enforce these rules and protect the individual from pressure or intrusion into his personal sphere by others. “Whereas forced obedience to common specific goals can be equated with slavery, respect for common abstract rules (even if they are felt as burdensome) creates space for the most extraordinary freedom and diversity.” (11)
Hayek justifies the necessity of freedom for the functioning of society with several arguments. (12) The first argument is people’s lack of information regarding the large number of factors on which the achievement of individual goals depends. Since we do not know exactly how our actions and institutions contribute to social order, compelling people to act according to a central plan (that is, unfreely) could (even if unintentionally) lead to the destruction of this mechanism. Second, freedom is crucial for creating space for something new, unforeseen, and therefore progressive. It is essential that freedom allows us to experiment and thus encourages progress in society. Hayek’s third argument is the finding that complexity requires freedom. According to him, unplanned societies are capable of much greater complexity than planned organizations.
The issue of freedom is closely related to the concept of private property, and not only in Hayek. Already ancient Rome provided the world with a model of private law based on a direct understanding of private (separate) property. No advanced civilization developed without a government that saw its main task in protecting private property, yet excessively strong governments instead stop further evolution and growth of spontaneous social order and voluntary cooperation. They tend to slide into abusing their power and restricting the freedom they once protected. Evidence for this is that modern industrialism developed not under strong governments but in the cities of the Italian Renaissance, in southern Germany, the Netherlands, and England.
Hayek defends rather the protection of individual ownership than political freedoms. Social order, he says, could have been formed only thanks to “separate ownership.” (13) The possibility for an individual to decide freely depends on the general respect for the private sphere in which the individual can act independently, and on an equally recognized way in which rights to the same things can be transferred from one person to another. “The basis for the spread of the dense texture of exchange of services, which constituted the extended order, was protection of separate ownership, not state steering of its use.” (14)
A person’s freedom is conditioned precisely by the existence of private ownership, thanks to which an individual is able to independently decide on his goals: “The individual who has enough resources can realize his individual intentions and goals.” (15) What becomes problematic here is that in society there are also individuals who do not possess material ownership to such an extent that they can realize their goals. Hayek nevertheless considers such social inequalities to be natural.
Another criticism in this respect concerns the fact that his concept of freedom does not apply to the human individual but to his social form as a private owner, because property belonging to the individual made the core of the individual sphere.
For his position on freedom, however, Hayek is also criticized. Paradoxically, as Manda states, the real basis of Hayekian freedom is precisely non-freedom. For most people, the private sphere is not the only sphere of their life; there is also the sphere of intentionally and deliberately created organizations, within which individuals’ conduct is guided by a common goal. The freedom of private owners is therefore ultimately the result of their non-freedom. From this perspective one can state that the human being in Hayek’s conception seems to exist in two worlds: in the private sphere, where he is free in an open society, and in the work sphere, which conditions the free society. (16) It is precisely the free economic market that holds society together, in which individuals can realize themselves. Individuals are, in this sense, only a kind of instrument: “Many people consider it outrageous that a large society has no specific common purposes, or, as we might say, that it is joined only by means and not by goals. It is in fact true that the main common purpose of all its members is purely instrumental, namely securing the emergence of an abstract order that has no specific purposes of its own but will increase for all people the prospects of achieving their respective goals.”(17) Individual freedom is to be an instrument for creating something abstract that has no purpose in relation to the individual.
From the above it can be concluded that, regardless of which goals an individual freely chooses, provided he respects the rules of society, he simultaneously reproduces and reinforces the foundations of that society. Since he therefore does not realize the general purpose of his activity, this activity is free, but at the same time unconscious and blind. (18)
The question of freedom is closely linked with the market system for Hayek, for which he uses the term “katalaxia” (19), which in free translation means the process of exchange. According to him this is a certain kind of game bounded by the possibilities and abilities of players, and the market mechanism is for the theorist a model of perfection, an abstract order where all rules apply and where success or failure depends on the individual, on the knowledge of his co-players, and on information gathering. It should also be noted that in explaining the market, its functioning, and its rules in civil society, Hayek is close to Popper’s theory of trial and error, which is typical of an open society. (20)
The market system does not require agreement on the goals to be achieved, and therefore does not limit individual freedom. It allows people with many different values and intentions to coexist beneficially, because by following their own interests each of them will support the goals of many others with different and perhaps even opposing interests. “A free society is a pluralistic society without a shared hierarchy of concrete goals.” (21) The market system is not and cannot be governed by any concrete value scale or hierarchy of goals as in a planned economy. Hayek argues that the larger the differences in needs and goals of the participating parties, the more likely is the benefit from their exchange. E. Butler agrees with this as well, stating about the economic and political contribution of Hayek’s philosophy: “Relations between people are means, allowing the reconciliation of different goals and the joining of people with completely different convictions and aims, because everyone gains from this joining.” (22)
To understand how the market works as Hayek understands it, one should at least briefly outline how communication functions within the market system and what his views on economic equilibrium are. As already mentioned, because the market is a certain kind of game, it is meaningless to plan it, because if we knew the outcome in advance, the game would lose meaning for us. What matters, however, is to establish fair rules so that everyone has a chance to get and strive to succeed in this game to the degree he himself considers necessary. Of course, like any game, success in the market also requires, besides rules, a suitable combination of skill and luck. The role of the state, or government, lies in ensuring the previously mentioned rules and respect for them. (23) The market communication system is very complex and works through a network of prices. Prices function as signals that allow an individual to contribute to the fulfillment of the needs of others without being aware of doing so, while at the same time achieving his own satisfaction. (24)
As for economic equilibrium in a market economy, Hayek is skeptical about it. Traditional equilibrium theory assumes that the economy is static, but according to Hayek, perfect knowledge of what is happening in the economy is impossible because participants in the market are constantly exposed to the changing plans of others: “If the concept of equilibrium has any meaning, then according to Hayek only for a particular individual, who knows exactly what plans he has and whose various intentions are in full and unshakable alignment. In society as a whole, however, nothing like this can ever occur.” (25) What actually exists in the market is some form of dynamic equilibrium, that is, development toward equilibrium, because the actions and plans of individual market participants have in the long term a tendency toward mutual compatibility.
In the end, we can conclude that Hayek’s market is not only the fulfillment of the ideal of economic perfection, but also the fulfillment of the striving of individuals, whom he sees as subjects endowed with freedom. The market is therefore a kind of “reconciler”, because it is based on the principle of moderated exchange, which in all circumstances replaces conflict with negotiation and thus neutralizes rivalry and envy in one stroke. (26) The progress Western civilization achieved in the 18th and 19th centuries could, according to Hayek, come about only thanks to the development of a market economy based on private property, division of labor, and voluntary exchange. Like L. von Mises, Hayek likewise viewed every attack on the market as an attack on freedom and the foundation of prosperity, which could again throw humanity back into a state of poverty and scarcity. (27)
Author: PhDr. Jarmila Jurová, PhD. Katedra všeobecnej a aplikovanej etiky Filozofická fakulta, Univerzita Konštantína Filozofa v Nitre References Benoist, A.: Kritika ideológie liberalizmu. In: Filozofia, roč. 63, 2008, č. 9, s.817 – 829. ISSN 0046-385X. Butler, E.: Hayek a jeho prínos k politickému a ekonomickému mysleniu dneška. Bratislava: Inštitút liberálnych štúdií, 1996. ISBN 80-967459-8-0. Hayek, F. A.: Osudná domýšlivost. Omyly socialismu. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1995. ISBN 80-85850-05-2. Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 1. Pravidla a řád. Praha: Academia, 1991. ISBN 80-200-0279-0. Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 2. Fata morgána sociální spravedlnosti. Praha: Academia, 1991. ISBN 80-200-0309-6. Hayek, F. A.: The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 59-11618. Manda, V.: Hayekova koncepcia slobody človeka. In: Človek, spoločnosť, myslenie. Banská Bystrica: UMB, 2002. s. 110-118. ISBN 80-8055-692-X. Mises, L.: Liberalismus. Praha: Liberální institut, 1998. ISBN 80-86119-08-4. Popper, K. R.: Otevřená společnost a její nepřátelé I., II. Praha: Oikúmené, 1994. ISBN 80-85241-53-6.
(1) Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 1. Pravidla a řád, s. 14-15, 31-32. (2) Hayek, F. A.: The Constitution of Liberty, s. 19. (3) In English, we know it as freedom from. (4) For the rule of law Hayek uses the English term rule of law. (5) Hayek, F. A.: The Constitution of Liberty, s. 21. (6) Hayek, F. A.: Osudná domýšlivost. Omyly socialismu, s. 70. (7) The assumption that “freedom is when I can do what I want” was probably already expressed by Voltaire. (8) Hayek, F. A.: The Constitution of Liberty, s. 144. (9) Manda, V.: Hayekova koncepcia slobody človeka, s. 110. (10) Hayek, F. A.: The Constitution of Liberty, s. 22 – 38. (11) Hayek, F. A.: Osudná domýšlivost. Omyly socialismu, s. 70. (12) Butler, E.: Hayek a jeho prínos k politickému a ekonomickému mysleniu dneška, s. 35 - 38. (13) Hayek uses the term separate ownership to refer to what we generally understand as private or individual ownership. (14) Hayek, F. A.: Osudná domýšlivost. Omyly socialismu, s. 38. (15) Manda, V.: Hayekova koncepcia slobody človeka, s. 112. (16) Manda, V.: Hayekova koncepcia slobody človeka, s. 113 – 114. (17) Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 2. Fata morgána sociální spravedlnosti. Praha: Academia, 1991, s. 106. (18) Manda, V.: Hayekova koncepcia slobody človeka. In: Človek, spoločnosť, myslenie. Banská Bystrica: UMB, 2002. s. 116. (19) Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 2. Fata morgána sociální spravedlnosti, s. 104. (20) See more on this: Popper, K. R.: Otevřená společnost a její nepřátelé I., II. (21) Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 2. Fata morgána sociální spravedlnosti, s. 105. (22) Butler, E.: Hayek a jeho prínos k politickému a ekonomickému mysleniu dneška, s. 54. (23) Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 1. Pravidla a řád,, s. 46 – 47. (24) See more on this: Hayek, F. A.: Právo, zákonodarství a svoboda 2. Fata morgána sociální spravedlnosti, s. 104 –122 (kapitola X.). (25) Butler, E.: Hayek a jeho prínos k politickému a ekonomickému mysleniu dneška, s. 67. (26) Benoist, A.: Kritika ideológie liberalizmu, s. 823. (27) See more on this: Mises, L.: Liberalismus.